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Pro-Work Reforms and Economic Adjustment: 
The Case of the North Korean Defector Settlement Support System 
Sam Han 
 
 This dissertation includes three papers on pro-work reforms of the North Korean Defector 
Settlement Support System (NKDSSS) and the economic adjustment of the North Korean 
Defectors (NKDs) in South Korea. Paper 1 analyzes changes in benefit levels caused by the pro-
work reforms to the NKDSSS and differences in the total benefit levels across groups, classified 
by the ability to work, employment status, and income level. Paper 2 examines the causal effect 
of the pro-work reforms on the NKDs’ economic adjustment. Paper 3 evaluates the association 
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Since the Division of Korea in 1945 through World War II, some North Korean (NK) 
people have escaped North Korea (NK) and defected to South Korea (SK) for various reasons; 
they are referred to as “North Korean Defectors (NKDs).” The number of NKDs entering SK 
annually, which had been in the dozens, increased dramatically to a few hundred beginning in 
the mid-1990s when famines ravaged NK,1 then a thousand in 2000, and then two thousand in 
2006.2 Since 2012, the number of NKDs entering SK has dropped by half due to changes in the 
political environment in NK and China3 (Jung, 2018; Kim, 2016); however, it can be expected to 
increase at any time if the political environment changes. Currently, 33,850 of NKDs are living 
in SK as of September 2021 (MOU, n.d.a); around 300,0004 of NKDs are estimated to live in 
China or other neighboring countries (Kim et al., 2009, Ko et al., 2004, as cited in Um et al., 
2015).  
NKDs are one of the world’s most vulnerable populations in terms of economic security, 
physical and mental health, and marginalization in society. Poverty and human rights violation is 
lifelong pain that most NKDs cannot escape from regardless of whether they live in NK, transit 
countries, or SK. To be specific, while in NK, most people have faced extreme poverty and 
 
1 In the mid-1990s, NK suffered a series of floods and droughts; this combined with its loss of Soviet support and 
the limitations of the communist system brought an enormous food crisis that resulted in mass starvation. Since then, 
the exodus of NK citizens to SK or other neighboring countries has drastically increased (Noland et al., 2001; 
Spoorenberg & Schwekendiek, 2012). 
2 The cumulative number of NKDs in SK, which was only 59 in the 1970s, 63 in the 1980s, rose to 488 in 1990s 
(Choi, 2016), 10,000 in 2007, 20,000 in 2010, and 30,000 in 2016 (MOU, n.d.a). 
3 The reduction was caused by the strict border patrols and inspections of NK (Jung, Y., 2018; Kim, 2016) and 
strengthened state security control of the Xinping government of China (Jeon, 2016; Kim, 2018), which has largely 
increased the broker cost from hundreds of yuan (between 15~150 USD) per person in the early 2000 to 
10,000~20,000 USD in 2018 (Jung, Y. 2018) 
4 There is no precise and official statistical data on NKDs living in other countries because NKDs in countries other 
than SK hide their identity for their safety. However, most domestic and international human rights groups estimate 




human rights violations5 that make it difficult for them to eat properly as demonstrated by the 
fact that between 0.24 and 3.5 million of NKs were starved to death during the NK famine 
(Noland et al., 2001; Spoorenberg & Schwekendiek, 2012). Around 300,000 NK people were 
fortunate to have escaped to China and the other neighboring countries; however, due to their 
unstable status6, many NKDs living abroad still live in abject poverty and suffer various human 
rights abuses7. For example, it was reported that 62.67% of the NKDs experienced extreme 
hunger and disease while in NK or transit countries, 21.7% experienced human trafficking, and 
9% of the female NKDs experienced sexual assault (National Human Rights Commission of 
Korea [NHRCK], 2017). After a long journey of extreme hardship, only about 30,000 NKDs 
succeed in entering the land of Canaan, SK; however, what awaits them upon their arrival in SK, 
with little human capital including low education and poor physical and mental health (Kim et 
al., 2009, Ko et al., 2004, as cited in Um et al., 2015) to survive in a highly competitive capitalist 
society, is a continuation of poverty and hardship and the addition of prejudice and 
discrimination (Yoon, 2016).  
To support the transition and settlement of NKDs, the SK government established the 
North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act (NKRPSSA) in 1997 and has 
provided settlement support. However, as the number of NKDs increased dramatically and most 
 
5 Many NKDs experience physical trauma (i.e., starvation, beatings, torture, and/or forced labor); political and 
ideological trauma (i.e., surveillance, brainwashing, forced witnessing of public executions, death of family 
members, and/or separation from the family); detection, arrest, and betrayer-related trauma (Jeon et al., 2005). 
6 While in transit countries, if NKDs’ escape is discovered by the NK officials, they are repatriated to NK and 
tortured or executed with their family members. Their family members in NK will be punished as well (Jeon et al., 
2005; Ko et al., 2004). This situation inevitably lets them to be exposed to the violation of various human rights 
(Kim et al., 2009; Ko et al., 2004).  
7 The percentage of women among NKDs is 72% as of September 2021 (MOU, n.d.a) and it is reported that 
approximately 80-90% of the female NKDs are victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation in China (Um et al., 
2015). The female NKDs have experienced forced marriage, prostitution, and sexual violence through human 
trafficking, as well as numerous other violations of human rights and psychological traumas (Kim, 2020; Lee & 
Kim, 2019).  
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of them remain in welfare programs after the end of the North Korean Defector Settlement 
Support System (NKDSSS) until mid-20008 (Park & Kim, 2012), the NKDSSS has been 
criticized for increasing welfare dependencies of NKDs. In response to the criticisms and 
financial burden by the increasing number of NKDs, the SK government implemented pro-work 
reform in 2005, which introduced and increased Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) conditioned 
on participation in job preparation activities (job training incentives and licensure acquisition 
incentives) or employment (employment encouragement incentives) and decreased 
Unconditional Cash Transfers (UCTs). However, as government reports9 revealed the 
ineffectiveness of those incentives, at the end of November 2014, the government replaced the 
two existing employment incentives conditioned on job preparation and employment subsidies 
with new incentives (savings incentives), which are conditioned on employment and whose 
benefit levels are determined by the amount of savings (Kim et al., 2016; Park & Kim, 2012; 
Park et al., 2011). However, there is also some opposition to the pro-work reforms, some based 
on potential abuse of the system by NKDs (i.e., ghost employees, feigning illness) while other 
critiques stem from prejudice or discrimination against NKDs (i.e., the perception of NKDs as 
communists who depend excessively on the government) (Kim et al., 2016; Park et al., 2011; 
Yoon, 2016). 
The pro-work trend is not confined to SK just for the NKDSSS. Since the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, which led to pro-
work reforms in the U.S. and other countries, the success of the pro-work welfare trend has been 
heavily debated. Supporters of pro-work welfare reforms argue that pro-work reforms decrease 
 
8 For example, the welfare receipt rate was 74.1 percent of NKDs in 2005 (KOSIS, n.d.a, as cited in Park, 2011). 
9 Kim and Baek (2010), a report from the Ministry of Unification (MOU); Choi et al. (2010), a report from the 
Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL); Park (2011), Park and Kim (2012), a report from the Korea Labor 
Institute (KLI) under the MOEL. 
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poverty and alleviate inequality by 1) helping existing welfare recipients to become self-reliant 
and independent from welfare, 2) motivating people to work by helping the “deserving” poor 
who work but are near-poor and not helping the “undeserving” poor who do not work, and 3) 
encouraging women with young children to have jobs rather than stay at home while taking care 
of her children. Critics of pro-work welfare reforms maintain that pro-work reforms do not 
decrease poverty effectively and increase inequality within the poor by 1) just removing 
recipients from the welfare without offering any ultimate poverty solution, 2) treating 
involuntarily jobless people as “undeserving” poor, and 3) having prejudices on welfare 
recipients and children from out of wedlock birth and not acknowledging unpaid caregiving 
work (Moffitt, 2015).  
The debate on the pro-work policy reform trend is closely linked to another heated debate 
on which types of cash transfers are more effective10: UCTs requiring only the means-tested 
standard versus CCTs attaching certain “conditions” (Gao, 2017). It is because pro-work policy 
reforms, by nature, change the UCTs to CCTs attaching the condition on employment or 
employment-related activities. To the best of my knowledge, the NKDSSS in SK is the only 
program in the world that provides benefits to the entire population; thus, studying the pro-work 
reforms to the NKDSSS case will enable us to see the impact of pro-work policy changes more 
clearly and add invaluable evidence to the international body of knowledge.  
 
10 CCT advocators argue that CCTs 1) help recipients not to choose sub-optimal behaviors and choose optimal 
behaviors by conditioning on them, 2) lower tax resistance by letting recipients do socially desirable behaviors, and 
3) show more effective outcomes to induce incentivized behaviors than UCTs. Empirical evidence that 4) UCTs 
may cause adverse unintended or unexpected behavioral outcomes are also legitimized CCTs. UCT advocators are 
against those arguments, arguing that 1) recipients know and can choose optimal behaviors if they have enough 
money, 2) CCTs can exclude specific population who should be equally concerned, 3) regardless of conditions, cash 
transfer itself increase behavioral outcomes, and 4) UCTs can also increase disincentivized but desired behaviors 
(Baird et al., 2014; Forget et al., 2013; Gao, 2017). Comparing economic and behavioral outcomes of UCTs and 
CCTs, most studies conclude 1) both CCTs and UCTs are effective in economic and behavioral outcomes and 2) 
CCTs are more likely effective for incentivized behaviors but less likely effective for the other desired outcomes 
while UCTs are vice versa (Baird et al., 2014). 
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My dissertation aims to find answers on whether pro-work reforms to the NKDSSS 
enhanced the economic adjustment of NKDs. To answer these questions, I review changes in 
benefit levels caused by the pro-work reforms (Paper 1), evaluate the effect of the pro-work 
reforms on economic adjustment (Paper 2), and examine the association between human capital 
and welfare receipt, considering the employment support programs as human capital invested by 
the government (Paper 3). 
Specifically, Paper 1 reviews changes in benefit levels caused by the pro-work reforms to 
the NKDSSS comprehensively while dividing the period into three sub-periods and the NKD 
population into four groups. Three sub-periods are 1) pre-pro-work reform period (1997−2004), 
2) first pro-work reform period (2005−2014), and 3) second pro-work reform period 
(2015−2019). The four groups are 1) Employed with High income (EH) group, 2) Employed 
with Low income (EL) group, 3) Able to work but Unemployed (AU) group, and 4) Unable to 
work and Unemployed (UU) group. It allows us to evaluate the characteristics of the first pro-
work reform period, distinct from the second pro-work reform period. By doing so, it enables us 
to see whether the NKDSSS is going in the right direction in a situation where no study 
quantitatively analyzes the late 2014 reform. This paper shows that a portion of UCTs decreased 
through the first pro-work reform period and that CCTs conditioned on job preparation decreased 
through the second pro-work reform period. In other words, the targeted population of the 
NKDSSS has narrowed down from all (pre-pro-work period) to job seekers or employed (first 
pro-work period) and to the employed only (second pro-work period).  
Paper 2 evaluates the effects of the 2005 pro-work policy reform as a whole on economic 
adjustment, using the 2010 National Survey of Domestic Violence: Married NKDs and a 
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) methodology. Results suggest that the pro-work 
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reforms did not increase economic adjustment outcomes (employment, household income level, 
cash transfers as the major income source, and welfare receipt). This implies that policy changes 
need to be formulated based on scientific evidence from evaluations of the policy outcomes. 
Another policy implication of this study is that more comprehensive settlement support policies 
that consider non-economic factors (i.e., physical and mental health, and family characteristics) 
are needed. 
Paper 3 examines the association between human capital and the welfare receipt of 
NKDs. Specifically, using the 2016 National Survey on the Status of the Education on 
Employment and Gender Equality of NKDs, it explores the role of human capital, measured by 
three means of its formation: education in NK and SK, work experience in NK and SK, and 
employment support programs in the NKDSSS. This paper finds that higher education in SK is 
associated with full welfare receipt, work experiences in SK are associated with decreases in 
both partial receipt and full receipt (with a bigger effect size for full receipt), job training is 
associated with increases in partial receipt, and license acquisition support is associated with 
decreases in partial receipt. These findings imply that the NKDSSS needs to help NKDs 
accumulate human capital in SK, especially, work experience in SK. The outcomes also imply 
that the government should set conditions for Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs) carefully so 












Paper 1: Pro-Work Reforms of the North Korean Defector 
Settlement Support System: 
Changes in Benefit Levels and Differences across Groups 
Abstract 
Employing a historical approach to policy analysis, this paper reviews changes in benefit 
levels of the North Korean Defector Settlement Support System (NKDSSS), over the three sub-
periods: 1) the pre-pro-work reform period (1997−2004), 2) the first pro-work reform period 
(2005−2014), and 3) the second pro-work reform period (2015−2019). Specifically, it analyzes 
changes in individual NKDSSS, divided by the Non-Social Security Support (NSSS11) and 
Social Security Support (SSS12). It also compares changes in the total benefits of the NKDSSS 
across four groups: 1) Employed with High income [EH], 2) Employed with Low income [EL], 
3) Able to work and Unemployed [AU], and 4) Unable to work and Unemployed [UU] groups, 
classified by the ability to work, employment, and income level. To summarize the primary 
findings, benefit levels of the NSSS and SSS dramatically changed by the three criteria during 
the first pro-work reform period and the special protection for the NKDs through the NKDSSS 
has been narrowed down from all to the EL group. Two significant concerns are noted in the AU 
group whose total benefit levels were enormously reduced both in the NSSS and SSS. 
Supplemental policies are required to support some of the AU group, fallen into the blind spot of 
poverty (i.e., the involuntarily unemployed) and penalized twice by the market and government 
for having a low level of human capital, inadvertently by the pro-work reforms. 
 
11 Settlement support ensured directly by the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act 
(NKRPSSA) 




Since the division of the Korean Peninsula in 1948, some North Korean (NK) people 
have escaped North Korea (NK) and defected to South Korea (SK) to avoid political repression, 
economic hardship, and/or religious persecution. Initially, only a few tens of North Korean 
Defectors (NKDs) had entered SK; however, a dramatic increase had occurred from a few tens to 
a few hundred since the mid-1990s in the wake of the severe famine in NK (Noland et al., 2001; 
Spoorenberg & Schwekendiek, 2012). As of September 2021, 33,850 NKDs (0.065% of the 
entire population of SK) are living in SK (Ministry of Unification [MOU], n.d.a) and around 
300,000 NKDs are estimated to reside in China and other neighboring countries (Southeast Asian 
countries, Mongolia, and Russia) (Kim et al., 2009 Ko et al., 2004, as cited in Um et al., 2015).  
In 1997, in an effort to assist the waves of NKDs entering SK without any means to 
survive in a market-based society, the South Korean (SK) government established the North 
Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act (NKRPSSA, bukhanitaljuminui boho 
mit jeongchakjiwone gwanhan beopryul). Under the NKRPSSA, the North Korean Defector 
Settlement Support System (NKDSSS) has provided 1) temporary financial support, 2) 
employment support, 3) housing support, 4) Social Security Support (SSS), 5) educational 
support, 6) counseling support, and 7) security support for the first five years, called “residence 
protection period” (Table 1-1, Art. 5 of the NKRPSSA). It was intended to allow NKDs to adapt 
to the capitalist system after years of being trapped in the outdated communist system.  
Meanwhile, since 1997, the U.S. has replaced the traditional cash transfer program, Aid 
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), with pro-work programs requiring work 
participation to obtain benefits, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). In addition, 
the work incentive tax credit program, Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), has dramatically 
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expanded (Moffitt, 2015). Welfare reforms in the U.S. have encouraged SK to implement similar 
work-focused reforms for a major public assistance program in SK, the National Basic 
Livelihood Security System (NBLSS) since 2007 and NKDSSS since 2005.  
The pro-work reforms to the NKDSSS were also started due to the concerns that the 
NKDSSS discourages the self-reliance of NKDs. The critics point out that after participating in 
the settlement program for the first five years, most NKDs become overly dependent on NBLSS. 
For example, in 2005, the welfare receipt rate was 74.1 percent (Korean Statistical Information 
Service [KOSIS], n.d., as cited in Park, 2011). To address this challenge, several pro-work 
reforms have been made to the NKDSSS (MOU, 2010–2019, 2014, & 2016), starting with the 
2005 reform, which introduced and increased benefits conditioned on participation in 
employment or job preparation and decreased the existing unconditional benefits (Park & Kim, 
2012). 
Regarding previous studies on the pro-work policy trend of the NKDSSS, despite the 
large government expenditures per capita13 and the great impact of policy changes on benefit 
levels, only three studies have analyzed the policy trends of the NKDSSS. Specifically, two 
studies (Choi, 2018; Kim et al., 2016) seek the determinants of changes in the policies (policy 
outcomes). Choi (2018) addresses the relationship while dividing the period by three sub-
periods: 1) 1962–1992, 2) 1993–1996, and 3) 1997–present. Kim et al. (2016) analyzes the 
relationship while dividing the period into four sub-periods: 1) 1997−2005, 2) 2006−2009, 3) 
2010−2012, and 4) 2013. Choi et al. (2010), a chapter of a report of the Ministry of Employment 
and Labor (MOEL), is the only study analyzing the pro-work reform trend, dividing the period 
 
13 The total expenditure of the NKDSSS accounts for only 0.01 percent of the total government expenditure and 1.43 
percent of the total expenditure of the NBLSS (National Assembly Budget office [NABO], 2020). However, the 
average total benefit levels of the NKDSSS per capita (8.748 million=52,525 million / 6004 persons13) is 4.5 times 
higher than the average total benefit levels of the NBLSS per capita (1.953 million). 
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into two sub-periods: 1) 2000−2004 and 2) 2005−2010, while introducing 2005, 2007, and 2009 
reforms. These studies are useful in that they provide information as to which benefits were 
introduced and abolished during the sub-divided periods. However, to find out how the pro-work 
reforms have affected the economic well-being of NKDs, further research is warranted as to how 
those changes have affected the total benefit levels. Also, considering that the pro-work reforms 
have influenced total benefit levels of the NKDSSS for NKDs in a non-uniform manner, a 
comparative analysis of the changes in benefit levels by subsets of NKDs is required to find a 
better policy solution. 
In reviewing the Acts, Presidential Decrees, enforcement rules of the NKRPSSA and 
NKD settlement support handbooks (MOU, 2010−2019), the 200514 and late 2014 reforms15 
marked big strides in changes in benefit types, levels, and conditions of the NKDSSS: The 2005 
pro-work reform introduced settlement incentives, and the late 2014 reform replaced the existing 
settlement incentives with the new settlement incentives and thereby abolished employment 
subsidies. The aforementioned studies provided policy outcomes of the 2005 pro-work reform. 
However, no study includes the era initiated by the late 2014 reform in their analysis. 
Meanwhile, debate on the success of pro-work reforms is closely associated with another 
heated debate on which types of cash transfers are more effective: Unconditional Cash Transfers 
(UCTs) without any condition except for the means-tested standard versus Conditional Cash 
Transfers (CCTs) with certain conditions (Gao, 2017). It is because pro-work reforms, by nature, 
change the UCTs to CCTs conditioned on employment or job preparation activities. Finding out 
which type of cash transfers are more effective will offer great policy implications for improving 
 
14 It has been applied to those who entered the country after January 1, 2005. 
15 It has been applied to those who entered the country after November 29, 2014. 
11 
 
the effectiveness of cash transfer programs. However, there is no study that analyzes the pro-
work policy trend of the NKDSSS while linking it to the discussion on the UCTs and CCTs.   
Using a historical approach to policy analysis (Hoefer, 2011), this study reviews the pro-
work reforms in the NKDSSS under the NKRPSSA. Specifically, this paper addresses the 
following research questions: 
1) How have the benefit levels of the individual NKDSSS, classified by the Non-Social 
Security Support (NSSS)16 and SSS, changed over the aforementioned three sub-
periods17? 
2) How have total benefit levels of the NKDSSS, measured by the NSSS and SSS, changed 
differently across the four groups18, classified by the ability to work, employment status, 
and income level?  
 
 
16 It consists of temporary financial support, housing support, and employment support. 
17 It encompasses three sub-periods: 1) the pre-pro-work reform period (1997−2004), 2) the first pro-work reform 
period (2005−2014), and 3) the second pro-work reform period (2015−2019). 
18 These groups are the Employed with High income [EH]; Employed with Low income [EL]; Able to work and 
Unemployed [AU], and Unable to work and Unemployed [UU] groups. 
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Compared to previous literature on policy trends of the NKDSSS, this study is unique 
due to the following five reasons: First, it estimates changes in benefit levels of the NSSS from 
the beneficiary's point of view, reflecting the Consumer Price Index (CPI). It calculates the total 
benefit levels of the NSSS per household and does not merely suggest changes in benefit levels 
of the individual NSSS (i.e., in 2007, benefit levels of the basic settlement money changed from 
KRW 10 million to 6 million). Second, it analyzes changes in benefit levels of the NKDSSS by 
groups while classifying the NKD population into four aforementioned groups with three criteria 
that the government used (the ability to work, employment status, and income level). No prior 
studies closely track the disparities of benefit levels within the NKD population through policy 
reforms. Third, it provides the pro-work policy trends comprehensively by including changes in 
benefit levels of the SSS. Fourth, it includes the era initiated by the late 2014 reform (2015 to 
Present) in the analysis. Previous literature (mostly government reports) analyzing the policies 
after the NKRPSSA described the characteristics and policy outcomes of the 2005 reform. 
However, no prior studies include the era initiated by the late 2014 reform in their analysis. 
Lastly, it illustrates changes in benefits, using the concepts of the UCTs and CCTs, so that it can 
provide policy implications for conditioning on cash transfers.  
 
The NKDSSS in SK19  
During the residency protection period, which is the first five years after leaving the 
temporary settlement support center for NKDs (Hanawon)20, the government provides a wide 
range of settlement support through the NKDSSS (MOU, n.d.b). Among the various support, this 
 
19 Sources of this section are the NKRPSSA (1997–2019), provided in Korean Law Information Center (KLIC, n.d.) 
and MOU (2010−2019), two reports from the MOEL (Choi et al., 2010, Park et al., 2011), and a report from the 
National Assembly Budget Office (NABO) (Ha, 2016). 
20 It provides urgent settlement support and social adaptation courses. 
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study analyzes the settlement support directly related to the economic well-being of NKDs 
(temporary financial support, employment support, housing support, and SSS) while dividing 
them into two types: 1) the NSSS (settlement support ensured directly by the NKRPSSA) and 2) 
the SSS (settlement support ensured indirectly by the NKRPSSA). In this section, I explain the 
NSSS first, which is the main support of the NKDSSS, followed by an explanation of the SSS. 
 
Non-Social Security Support  
As shown in Table 1-1, the NSSS is settlement support ensured directly by the 
NKRPSSA: temporary financial support, employment support, housing support, educational 
support, counseling support, and security support. Temporary financial support consists of 
settlement money (and goods) (Art. 21-1 of the NKRPSSA; Art. 39 of the Presidential Decree of 
the NKRPSSA) and due compensation21 (Art. 21-2 of the NKRPSSA; Art. 40 of the Presidential 
Decree of the NKRPSSA). Settlement money includes basic settlement money (UCT), additional 
settlement money (UCT), and settlement incentives (CCT). Basic settlement money is a UCT 
provided to all. Additional settlement money is a UCT only provided to groups with certain 
criteria (i.e., over the age of 60, existence and level of disability [level 1-3 in decreasing order of 
severity], having a chronic disease, or children born in a single-parent family or a foreign 
country). Settlement incentives refer to employment incentives and local residence incentives. 
Housing support includes rental deposits (unconditional, in-kinds [occasionally cash] benefits) 
and local residence incentives (CCT). 
 
21 Due compensation is offered if NKDs (mostly, NK elites or soldiers) provide valuable information for national 
security or related to the following equipment: warships, fighter-bombers, tanks, (guided) weapons, other airplanes, 
and goods (Art. 40 of the Presidential Decree of the NKRPSSA). Due compensation is not included in the analysis 
because NK “elites” or soldiers do not represent the overwhelming majority of NKDs, and it may distort or skew the 
study outcomes (Table 1-1). 
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 Employment incentives (CCTs) are divided into two: one for the employers hiring NKD 
employees and the other for the NKD employees. Employment incentives for the employers 
hiring NKD employees are employment subsidies. Employment incentives for the NKD 
employees are divided into two: one conditioned on job preparation activities (job training 
incentives and license acquisition incentives) and the other conditioned on employment 
(employment encouragement incentives and savings incentives) (Table 1-1). 
 
Social Security Support 
The SSS is settlement support ensured by other Acts (the National Basic Livelihood 
Security Act, the Medical Care Assistance Act, and the National Pension Act) commissioned by 
the NKRPSSA. Livelihood benefits and National Pension benefits are UCTs and the medical 
benefits are unconditional in-kind benefits which are open to all (Table 1-1). These benefits are 
designed for the welfare of all SK residents. During the residency protection period, the 
government gives more generous SSS for NKDs than the ordinary SK welfare recipients through 
various preference mechanisms. This is achieved by either relaxing the eligibility criteria or 
increasing benefit levels of the national social security programs for NKDs. Thus, changes in 
benefit levels of the SSS can be assessed by examining 1) the gap in benefit levels of the general 
recipients and NKDs and 2) changes in the degree of preference of each SSS.  
Looking at the livelihood benefits first, to receive the livelihood benefits through the 
NBLSS participation, SK households need to meet two criteria: income and absence of 
obligatory providers (i.e., high-income adult children). The income criterion requires the pre-
household income to be less than the Minimum Cost of Living (MCL), the official poverty 
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threshold, proportional to the number of family members22. The existence of the obligatory 
providers is a disqualification for welfare program participation. Second, to receive the 
livelihood benefits, recipients need to meet a condition, which is the participation of 
government-sponsored work programs known as “self-support programs.”  inally, benefit levels 
are determined as the difference between the official poverty threshold corresponding to the 
number of family members and pre-household income (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family 
[MOGEF], 2009–2019a).  
The advantages given to NKDs related to the livelihood benefits are as follows: First, 
regarding the eligibility, the income criterion was relaxed. In the case of NKD families, 
household income just needs to be less than the MCL for households having one additional 
family member (Exemption 1.1). For example, the household income of an NKD family having 
three family members should be less than the MCL for families having four family members (not 
three as for the other recipient households). Moreover, settlement money, settlement incentives, 
and rental deposits are exempted when estimating pre-household income (Exemption 1.2). NKD 
households are also exempt from the obligatory criterion (Exemption 2). Second, NKD recipients 
are exempt from all work-required conditions for the first five years (Exemption 3). Lastly, 
benefit levels of the NKD households are determined by the difference between the MCL for 
households having one additional family member and their pre-household income (Exemption 4) 
(MOU, 2010–2019). For example, benefit levels for the NKD families having three family 
members are the difference between the MCL for families having four family members and their 
household income (not three as for the other recipient households).  
 
22 Before the 2015 reform of the NBLSS, the official poverty threshold was the MCL, which the government decides 
and reports every three years.  
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Regarding the medical benefits, NKD families are ensured by Medical Care Assistance 
Act, delegated by the NKRPSSA, not by the National Basic Livelihood Security Act. The 
eligibilities and conditions for the medical benefits for the ordinary SK recipients are as same as 
those for the livelihood benefits. Regarding the benefit level for the SK households, medical 
benefit level 1 (almost free) is provided to households not having a family member with the 
ability to work; medical benefit level 2 (co-pay) is provided for households having a family 
member with the ability to work (MOGEF, 2009–2019b).  
The advantages given to NKDs related to the medical benefits are as follows: First, the 
income criterion was relaxed. In the case of NKD families, household income must be less than 
120, not 100 percent of the MCL for households (Exemption 1.1). When the existing NKD 
recipient households experience increases in household incomes, they forfeit the livelihood 
benefits but continue to receive the medical benefits. Regarding the eligibility, the obligatory 
criterion is exempt (Exemption 2). Second, the NKD recipients are exempt from all work-
required conditions for the first five years (Exemption 3). Lastly, for the NKD families, medical 
expenses are fully exempt (level 1) regardless of having a family member with the ability to 
work (Exemption 4) (MOU, 2010–2019). 
Regarding the National Pension benefits, SK citizens can receive the elderly pension 
benefits after they have paid into the system for at least ten years. However, NKDs entering SK 
at the age of 55 can still receive the elderly pension benefits at the age of 60 if they have paid 




Policy Background: Pro-Work Policy Trend of the NKDSSS in SK23  
Pro-work policy trend of the Non-Social Security Support  
The NKDSSS has changed in three phases: 1) the pre-pro-work reform period 
(1997−2004) with no conditions on receiving settlement supports except for employment 
subsidies; 2) the first pro-work reform period (2005−2014) with UCTs and CCTs conditioned on 
job preparation and employment; 3) the second pro-work reform period (2015− resent) with 
UCTs and CCTs conditioned on employment.  
During the first pro-work reform period, there were several pro-work reforms: 1) the 
2005 pro-work reform introduced employment incentives conditioned on job preparation 
activities (job training and license acquisition incentives) or employment retention (employment 
encouragement incentives); 2) the 2007 pro-work reform increased the proportion of CCTs in the 
settlement money and the employment protection period; 3) the 2010 reform added the 
employment exception system, which strengthened the protection of those who are employed 
and imposed penalties on “ghost” employees24 and introduced the local residence incentives (one 
of the settlement incentives); 4) the 2013 reform increased the employment protection period. 
Although the 2013 reforms slightly increased the UCT ratio and the increasing projection of the 
CCT ratio was halted, it was not a conspicuous turnaround as the UCT increase was only 
marginal; and 5) finally, the early 2014 reform excluded the NKD households above the average 
income from the employment exception system for medical assistance (Appendix 1-1).  
 
23 Sources of this section are the NKRPSSA (1997–2019), provided in K  C (n.d.) and MOU (2010−2019), two 
reports from the MOEL (Choi et al., 2010, Park et al., 2011), and a report from the National Assembly Budget 
Office (NABO) (Ha, 2016). 
24 This refers to NKDs who pretend to be employed after conspiring with employers to take advantage of the fact 
that the government subsidizes half of an NKD's salary (employment subsidies). 
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The second pro-work reform period begins with the late 2014 reform, which abolished 1) 
two employment incentives conditioned on job preparation, and 2) employment subsidies 
conditioned on employment and introduced the savings incentives conditioned on employment 
whose benefit levels are determined by the amount of savings. As a result of this reform, the only 
benefit that remained in place was employment subsidies and employment incentives 
conditioned on “employment.”  fterward, there had been no major changes until the 2019 
reform, which only slightly increased benefit levels of the UCTs (basic settlement money and 
rental deposits) (Appendix 1-1).  
 
Pro-work policy trend of the Social Security Support 
Appendix 1-2 presents changes in benefit levels of the individual SSS. Through the pro-
work reforms, the exemptions for NKD households were eliminated or eased by whether: 1) the 
ability to work (in case of the livelihood benefits); 2) the employment status with the above-
average income (in case of the medical benefits). Changes in benefit levels of the SSS occurred 
only during the first pro-work reform period. 
Reviewing the livelihood benefits first, through the pro-work reforms, the exemptions to 
the livelihood benefits for NKD households were abolished or alleviated. Specifically, the 2005 
pro-work reform removed Exemptions 1.1 and 4 and reduced the application period of 
Exemption 3 from five years to one year. The 2007 pro-work reform further reduced the 
application period of Exemption 3 from one year to six months for the households having a 
person(s) with the ability to work. Also, the exemption period for all exemptions was reduced 
from five years to three years for the households with the ability to work.  
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Regarding the medical benefits, through the pro-work reforms, the exemptions to the 
medical benefits for NKD households were eradicated or decreased as follows: First, the 2010 
reform reduced Exemption 1.1 by setting an income cap. Specifically, it protects the existing 
NKD beneficiaries not to lose their rights to receive the medical benefits within the five-year 
residence protection period, only if household income is less than 400 percent of the MCL. In 
2013, the government started to support half of the insurance payments for the National Health 
Insurance (NHI), except for persons with more than the average monthly household income of 
urban workers in the previous year25. Regarding the National Pension benefits, there was no 
change throughout the NKRPSSA. 
 
Literature Review  
 Previous studies on the policy trend are divided into two: one sees changes in the 
policies as policy outcomes and explores the determinants of the policy outcomes (Choi, 2018; 
Kim et al., 2016) and the other one analyzes the pro-work policy trend of the NKDSSS (Choi et 
al., 2010). Reviewing the former studies first, using the historical approach, Choi (2018) shows 
how structural conditions (perception of NKDs, policy toward NK, and inter-Korean relations) 
has changed and how those have affected the settlement support policies for NKDs by dividing 
the period into three periods: 1) “the Cold War and regime competition era (1962–1992),” 2) 
“the  ost-Cold War and inter-Korean coexistence” (1993–1996),” and 3) “the  unshine and 
Post-Sunshine Policy era (1997–present)” (p. 82, 84, & 87). Kim et al. (2016) addresses the 
influencing factors (political, social, and economic contexts, and types of policy networks) of 
 
25 In 2014, the income criterion was changed from 120 percent of the MCL to 50 percent of median income (for the 
new employed households, from 400 percent of the MCL to 160 percent of median income) (MOU, 2010–2019). 
However, these changes were caused by measurement of poverty line, and the absolute amount of the income 
criterion and benefit levels were similar. 
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policy outcomes (the establishment of the current NKDSSS under the NKRPPSSA in 1997 and 
policy reforms in 2006, 2010, and 2013). These studies are interesting in that they provide the 
background of policy trends of the pre- and current NKDSSS. However, I will not address 
specific findings of these studies related to the relationship between determinants and policy 
outcomes, slightly off the aims of this study. The latter study (Choi et al., 2010) provides the pro-
work reform trend and comprehensive information on employment support programs of the 
NKDSSS, dividing the period into two: 1) employment support centered on public assistance 
(2000-2004) 2) employment support centered on work incentive system (2005-2009). These 
studies provide introduction, increases or decreases, abolition of certain programs during the 
program as described in the 1.3 Policy Background section.  
Meanwhile, there are two more useful studies (Park et al., 2011; Ha, 2016). These studies 
do not address the policy trend of the NKDSSS. Specifically, Park et al. (2011) evaluates the 
effects of the individual employment support programs while Ha (2016) evaluates the effect of 
the NKDSSS in 2015. I will not analyze these studies because these studies focus on evaluating 
certain policies or policies in certain years. However, I use these studies to find figures, not 
provided in the NKRPSSA (1997–2019) in K  C (n.d.) and MOU (2010−2019), using the fact 
that these studies are government reports26 and have lots of specific information. Changes in 
benefit levels of the NKDSSS by sub-periods suggested in the previous studies (Choi et al., 
2010; Choi, 2018; Kim et al., 2016; Park et al., 2011) are as follow: 
 1997–2004 2005–2009 2010–2012 2013–Present 
Basic settlement 
subsidies 
KRW 35M KRW19M No change No change 
Grace period for 
welfare program 
participation 
5 years 2 years -> 1 year No change No change 
Employment 
incentives 






26 Park et al. (2011) is a report from the MOEL; Ha (2016) is a report from the NABO. 
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KRW 0~25.1 M 
Employment 
protection period 
0 2~3 years No change 3~4 years 
Savings subsidy None None None The same amount of 
savings from the 
earned income (up 








0 0 0 2~4 years 
Notes: In presenting this table, I summarized information compiled and extrapolated from Choi et al. (2010), Choi 




This study reviews the policy trend, employing the historical approach to policy analysis 
(Hoefer, 2011), which discusses past and present policies in the context of the present condition 
and enables us to consider and offer alternative policies to current issues and problems. For 
evaluating the policy trend of the NKDSSS, I compiled and summarized the datasets (Appendix 
1-1 & 1-2), collecting multiple data sources including a variety of documents and articles as 
follow: 
• Acts, Presidential Decrees, and enforcement rules of the NKRPSSA: Korean Law 
Information Center (KLIC) 
• Government reports and websites of the related government agencies: Bank of Korea, 
Korea Hana Foundation (KHF), Korean Labor Institute (KLI), Ministry of Employment 
and Labor (MOEL), Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF), Ministry of 
Government Legislation (MOGL), Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), Ministry of 
Unification (MOU), and National Assembly Budget Office (NABO), Statistics Korea. 
• Articles: database (KISS, DBPIA, RISS for articles written in Korean, Google scholars, 
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and CLIO for articles written in English) 
Most figures and information are drawn from the government, which possesses 
information about all NKDs; thus, the authenticity, credibility, and representativeness of sources 
are ensured with a high degree of confidence (Hoefer, 2011).  
As for the data (Appendix 1-1), there are two considerations to note. First, in the case of 
benefit levels of additional settlement money, no data was available before 2010. Thus, I 
assumed that benefit levels of additional settlement money in absolute terms between 1997 and 
2004 were 80 percent relative to 2010, considering that the benefit level of additional settlement 
money had been 40 times of the MCL before 2005 and has been 50 times of the monthly MCL 
since 2005. The benefit level in absolute terms between 2005 and 2009 was assumed to be as 
same as 2010, considering that there was no change between 2010 and 2019; there has been no 
comment on its change in the previous literature including government reports, implying the 
absence of any significant changes. Second, among the vulnerable population receiving 
additional settlement money, I excluded households having children born overseas from the 




  To answer the first research question, this study estimates changes in benefit levels of the 
individual NSSS and SSS by three pro-work periods: 1) the pre-pro-work reform period 
(1997−2004), 2) the first pro-work reform period (2005−2014), and 3) the second pro-work 
reform period (2015−2019). To answer the second research question, it calculates changes in 
total benefit levels of the NSSS and SSS over the three periods across groups. For the analysis, I 
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divide the NKD population into four groups with the three criteria (ability to work, employment 
status, and income level) that the government used to determine the benefit levels as follows: 
1) (Able to work), Employed with High income ([A]EH): households having a person(s) 
employed with the above-average income; 
2) (Able to work), Employed with Low income ([A]EL): households having a person(s) 
employed with the below-average income. 
3) Able to work and Unemployed (AU): households having a person(s) able to work8 and 
unemployed; and 
4) Unable to work and Unemployed (UU): households composed only of a person(s) unable 
to work and unemployed.   
Since it is granted for the employed to have the ability to work, the AEH group was 
simplified as the “  ” group; because the income level was not used as a criterion for 
calculating benefit levels of the NSSS, I will collectively refer to the EH and EL groups as the 
Able to work and Employed (AE) group. It is important to note that these groups are not fixed, 
so people in each group could move around and change group membership, possibly as a 
response to policy changes at the margins. 
 
Data analysis 
To answer the first research question, I estimate changes in benefit levels of the 
individual NSSS and SSS by pro-work reform periods. Specifically, I calculate the differences 
between benefit levels of the year preceding the commencement of the reform period and the 
final year of the reform period. For example, the changes in benefit levels of the first pro-work 
reform period (2005−2014) are calculated by subtracting benefit levels of 2004 from benefit 
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levels of 2014. During this process, the benefit level is estimated based on a single NKD 
household living in Seoul to control the effects of household size and region. 
To answer the second research question, I calculate and compare changes in total benefit 
levels of the NSSS and SSS by three pro-work reform periods across groups. The total benefit 
levels for four groups were calculated by adding the amount of all the benefits that each group 
can receive (Table 1-2). 
 
Results 
Changes in each and the total benefit levels of the NKDSSS   
Changes in benefit levels of the individual Non-Social Security Support  
Table 1-3 presents changes in benefit levels of the individual NSSS. To summarize, it 
shows that during the pre-pro-work reform period, all the UCTs slightly decreased. During the 
first pro-work reform period, benefit levels of most UCTs decreased significantly while those of 
the CCTs increased dramatically. During the second pro-work reform period, benefit levels of 
the UCTs increased slightly while those of the CCTs had moderately decreased.  
In detail, during the pre-pro-work reform period, basic and additional settlement money, 
and rental deposits had decreased by 21.4 percent. Inflation appears to be the only cause of these 
changes27. During the first pro-work reform period, benefit levels of the UCTs had decreased 
(basic settlement money by 80.8 percent; additional settlement money by 3.9 percent) except for 
rental deposits, which had increased by 33.3 percent. On the contrary, benefit levels of the CCTs 
had increased dramatically (total employment support, by 195.4 percent; employment subsidies 
alone by 53.8 percent). During the second pro-work reform period (2014−2019), benefit levels of 
 
27 Unless inflation was the sole cause of the changes to the benefit levels, no further discussion is warranted.  
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the UCTs had slightly increased (basic settlement money by 8 percent; rental deposits by 17 
percent) except for additional settlement money, which had decreased by 5.3 percent. The benefit 
levels of the CCTs, however, had moderately decreased (total employment support by 16.8 
percent; employment subsidies by 100.0 percent; job training incentives by 100.0 percent; 
license acquisition incentives by 100.0 percent; and employment encouragement incentives by 
5.3 percent).  
  
Changes in benefit levels of the individual Social Security Support  
Table 1-4 indicates changes in benefit levels of the individual SSS. The benefits levels of 
the individual SSS changed only during the first pro-work reform period. Specifically, the 
livelihood benefits decreased for households having the ability to work by removing the 
exemptions 1.1, 3, 4, and exemption on the period. Through the reform, benefit levels of NKD 
households changed from significantly higher to slightly higher than the other SK recipient 
households. Regarding the medical benefits, income eligibility was increased from 120 percent 
to 400 percent (Exemption 1.1), enabling more NKD households to be able to receive the 
medical benefits. However, the exemption period was reduced from no limit to five years. 
Additionally, in 2013, the NHI support was introduced. The NHI support was available to those 
whose average monthly household income was less than the urban workers of the preceding 
year. This measure is interpreted as a safeguard for the working poor after reducing or 






Changes in total benefit levels of the NKDSSS across groups 
Changes in total benefit levels of the Non-Social Security Support across groups 
Table 1-5 suggests the changes in total benefit levels of the NSSS across groups. In 
detail, during the pre-pro-work reform period, total benefit levels of the NSSS have changed 
across groups as follows (preference shown in descending order): AE (+5.2%), AU (-21.4%), 
and UU (-21.4%). A gap between the AE and AU groups, classified by employment status is 
26.6 percent; no gap is found between the AU and UU groups, classified by the ability to work. 
During the first pro-work reform period, those that have changed across groups are as 
follows (preference shown in descending order): AE (+7.0%), UU (-48.6%), and AU (-56.7%). 
A gap between the AE and AU groups, classified by employment status is 63.7 percent; a gap 
between the AU and UU groups, classified by the ability to work, is 7.4 percent. 
During the second pro-work reform period, those that have changed across groups are as 
follows (preference shown in descending order): AU (+13.6%), UU (+8.4%), and AE (-7.6%). A 
gap between the AE and AU groups, classified by employment status, is 21.2 percent; a gap 
between the AU and UU groups, classified by the ability to work, is 5.0 percent. 
Overall, those that have changed across groups are as follows (preference shown in 
descending order): AE (+4.6%), UU (-61.6%), and AU (-64.5%). Through the pro-work reforms, 
a noticeable gap in changes in total benefit levels in the NSSS (69.1%) has been created between 
the AE and AU groups, classified by employment status; a very small gap in those (2.4%) has 






Changes in total benefit levels of Social Security Support across groups 
Table 1-6 suggests the changes in total benefit levels of the SSS across groups. Benefit 
levels of the individual SSS changed only during the first pro-work reform period. In detail, 
during the first pro-work reform period, regarding the livelihood benefits, all of the groups 
having the ability to work (EH, EL, and AU) experienced around 20.2% decreases in the 
livelihood benefits while the UU group experienced no changes. Regarding the medical benefits, 
the EL group experienced increases in the medical benefits in total (Transfer to Level 1 (almost 
free), half of the NHI payment support). The calculation process for changes in the livelihood 
and the medical benefits is provided in Appendix 1-3 and 1-4. 
Overall, total benefit levels of the SSS have changed across groups as follows (preference 
shown in descending order): UU (no change), EL (decreases in the livelihood benefits and 
increases in the medical benefits), and AU and EH (decreases in the livelihood benefits). 
Through the pro-work reforms, a gap in changes in total benefit levels in the SSS has been found 
between one of the AE and AU groups, classified by the employment status (no gap is noted 
between the AU and EH groups; a gap in the medical benefits is observed between the AU and 
EL groups). A gap in the livelihood benefits has been created between the AU and UU groups, 
classified by the ability to work; a gap in the medical benefits has been created between the EH 
and EL groups, classified by the ability to work.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion  
This study reviews how the pro-work reforms have affected changes in benefit levels of 
the NKDSSS for NKDs in SK. Specifically, it analyzes changes in benefit levels of the 
individual NSSS and SSS over the three sub-periods: 1) the pre-pro-work reform period 
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(1997−2004), 2) the first pro-work reform period (2005−2014), and 3) the second pro-work 
reform period (2015−2019). It also evaluates how changes in total benefit levels of the NSSS and 
SSS are varied across four groups (EH, EL, AU, and UU groups), classified by the ability to 
work, employment status, and income level. For that, I generated data by gathering information 
from government documents and previous literature and analyzed the data by a historical 
approach to policy analysis. 
To summarize the findings of changes in benefit levels of the individual settlement 
support, during the pre-pro-work reform period (1997−2004), there had been moderate decreases 
in the UCT portion of the NSSS (21.4%), only caused by inflation. Benefit levels of the SSS had 
not changed. During the first pro-work reform period (2005−2014), as for the NSSS, benefit 
levels of the UCTs had decreased (especially, basic settlement money decreased drastically [by 
80.8 percent]), except for rental deposits. On the contrary, benefit levels of the CCTs had 
increased dramatically (by 195.4%). In terms of the SSS, benefit levels of the livelihood benefits 
had decreased by one condition: the ability to work. Benefit levels of the medical benefits 
increased by meeting two conditions: 1) being employed and 2) having a low income. During the 
second pro-work reform period (2014−2019), as for the NSSS, benefit levels of the UCTs had 
slightly increased (by 8%), except for additional settlement money, which had decreased slightly 
(by 5.3%). Benefit levels of the CCTs, however, had significantly decreased (by a range of 5.3% 
to 100.0%). Regarding the SSS, there had been no changes in benefit levels.  
To compare the changes in total benefit levels across groups, no group (except for the EL 
group) seems to have experienced increases in the total benefits levels of the NKDSSS. The AU 
group experienced a great reduction both in the NSSS and SSS. This means that the government 
almost removed special protection for NKDs for this group. The UU group experienced a drastic 
29 
 
reduction in the NSSS with no changes in the SSS. This means that the government adjusted the 
benefit levels of this group from special protection to the levels that are merely higher than the 
national low-income families in SK. The EH group experienced an increase in the NSSS; 
however, the increases were considerably offset by the decreases in the SSS. This means that the 
government changed the way of supporting this group from the SSS (UCTs or unconditional in-
kinds) to the NSSS (CCTs). Only the EL group did not experience a reduction both in the NSSS 
and SSS (increases in the NSSS and mixed outcomes in the SSS). The trends show that the 
government waned its special protection from all NKDs to shift its focus on the EL group. Here, 
some concerns arise on these trends, which will be discussed in the next section.  
 Considering that most NKDs enter SK in their productive years and that the upward 
projection is anticipated in the entry number, it is justifiable to encourage NKDs to work. 
However, the pro-work reforms may have unintended policy outcomes. Especially, two 
significant concerns arise regarding the great reduction in benefit levels of the AU group: the 
pro-work reforms may 1) create a blind spot of poverty and 2) exacerbate inequality within the 
NKD population.  
The pro-work reforms may create a blind spot of the settlement support for NKDs who 
are categorized as the AU group, but in reality, are aligned closer to the UU group (involuntarily 
unemployed group). For example, females with young children may have the ability to work; in 
practice, however, their ability to work can be hindered due to their childcare needs. To further 
complicate the matter, unlike most females in SK who have extended family support networks to 
assist with childcare, NK females lack this support. In 2019, a female NKD who was a single 
mother and her six-year-old son starved to death in SK (MOU, 2019). This shocked the entire 
nation because although death from starvation is an unfortunate, everyday reality in NK, it is 
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unheard of in SK. Therefore, there should be a supplementary policy with two options: 1) re-
classifying NKDs in blind spots of poverty (who are currently categorized as the AU group) into 
the UU group for a certain period, as an interim measure, or 2) keeping them as the AU group 
while providing sufficient support. 
A recent positive development is that single parents in the AU group can now benefit 
from the 4th Basic Plan for Low Fertility and Aging Society, initiated in 2021. As the low 
fertility rate has been a social problem in SK (SK ranked the lowest total fertility rate of 0.84 in 
2020 among the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] countries), 
the government has announced a series of pregnancy, childbirth, and childcare support policies28 
(The Presidential Committee on Ageing Society and Population Policy [PCASPP], 2020; Kim, 
2021). However, there are two areas that warrant further improvement: First, for the households 
having an infant (less than 24 months), it will be better if paid parental leave is provided for all 
children rather than only for the first child. Second, for the households having a child (25 to 86 
months), it will be better if the total benefit level (childcare allowance and child allowance) is 
more than KRW 200,000, considering that the average childcare cost is estimated to be KRW 
1.07 million in SK (Results of the 2016 Parenting Culture Awareness Survey conducted by the 
MOGEF, cited in Nam, 2017).  
Meanwhile, notwithstanding the aforementioned group (i.e., single parent) who 
demonstrate clear factors that prevent employment, there is another subset of the involuntarily 
 
28 For all pregnant women, pregnancy vouchers (KRW 1 million) are provided. For women who have given birth, 
paid maternity leave are provided for three months after childbirth (In the first two months, 100% of the salary is 
provided by the employers, and in the last month, KRW 2 million is provided by the government). In addition, paid 
parental leave is provided for one year with 80% of the salary only for the first child. For households having an 
infant (less than 24 months), infant allowance (KRW 300,000 per month) is provided for one year (The amount of 
the infant allowance is expected to increase to KRW 400,000 in 2024 and KRW 500,000 in 2025). For households 
having a child (24 to 86 months), a childcare allowance (KRW 100,000 per month) is provided. Finally, for 
households having a child including an infant (0 to 95 months), child allowance (KRW 100,000 per month) is 
provided in addition to the infant or childcare allowance (PCASPP, 2020; Kim, 2021).  
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employed in the AU group due to the low human capital. Most NKDs enter SK with little human 
capital. In SK, even SK people find it difficult to find jobs due to technological advancement and  
economic stagnation. The grim realities for NKDs are much harsher; NKDs are more likely to 
become involuntarily unemployed. Considering the aim of the NKRPSSA to help NKDs to 
adjust to  K society “as swiftly as possible to adapt themselves to and settle down in, all spheres 
of their lives, including political, economic, social and cultural spheres” ( rt. 1 of the 
NKRPSSA), supplementary policies are needed for NKDs who are involuntarily unemployed or 
non-economically active during the grace period. That is, the NKDSSS needs to ensure that 
benefit levels of the UCTs serve as a basic means of survival and help the involuntarily jobless 
NKDs to successfully enter the labor market in SK.  
The pro-work reforms may exacerbate inequality within the NKD population. As the 
influx of NKDs dramatically increases, the degree of accumulated human capital within the 
NKD population (i.e., education levels) has been diversified. Due to the varying degrees of 
competence, some face drastic disadvantages from finding gainful employment, while others do 
not face such adversities. The pro-work reforms, although not by design, ultimately reward 
NKDs having a high level of human capital and penalize NKDs with a low level of human 
capital, who already face insurmountable challenges in the labor market. The government needs 
to acknowledge that NKDs have varying degrees of preexisting advantages and disadvantages 
when entering SK. A common misconception is that all NKDs have similar degrees of human 
capital. However, over the past two decades, the explosion of the population growth of NKDs 
has also been met with expanding diversity and polarizing disparities in human capital levels. 
Thus, certain measures and safeguards are needed to assure that the policy change does not 
inadvertently widen the disparities and exacerbate the inequalities within the NKD population. 
32 
 
Limitations of this study mostly come from the data. Benefit levels presented in this 
paper are estimated by the maximum amount that NKDs are eligible to receive; the actual 
amount that NKDs have received might be different and such information is not open to the 
public. If this raw data were made publicly available, it will be interesting to review changes in 
benefit levels that NKDs actually received and compare those with changes in benefit levels 
suggested in this study. However, using the maximum amount presented in the NKRSSA and the 
NKDSSS handbooks was the most optimal way to figure out changes in benefit levels of the 
NKDSSS by the pro-work reforms. Second, I had to use the estimated figures for the additional 
basic settlement money prior to 2010 because no data was made available for the time frame.  
Due to the unavailability of data, despite the significance of research in this area, there 
are only a few qualitative studies or government reports providing simple summary statistics. As 
such, there is no study that addresses the effect of the pro-work reforms in total as for the other 
cases (i.e., pro-work reforms of the NBLSS). Through extensive time and effort, I created tables, 
which show the annual policy outcomes (Appendix 1-1 & 1-2) while gathering all the 
information from all sources and analyzing it thoroughly. This effort allowed me to interpret the 
findings, which examine the effects of the pro-work reforms on the economic adjustment 
outcomes of the NKDSSS. I hope that my efforts also help other researchers when evaluating the 





Table 1-1: Settlement support provided in the residence protection period (first five years), 1997-2019 







Settlement money (and goods) Basic settlement money  Cash U Ministry of 
Unification Additional settlement 
money 
Cash U 
Settlement incentives* Cash C 
Due compensation  Cash C 





U Ministry of Health 
and Welfare 



















Savings incentives Cash C 
Education support Tuition and School Fees In-kinds U to C Ministry of 
Unification Special Admission System for Colleges In-kinds C 
Counseling support Youth Social Safety Net (Multicultural Background Migrant 
Youth Support) 
In-kinds U Ministry of Gender 
Equality and 
Family Support Project for Violent Migrant Women (Preventing 
Violence against NK women and Supporting NK Women) 
In-kinds U 







Livelihood benefits Cash U Ministry of Health 
and Welfare 
 
Medical benefits In-kind U 
National Pension benefits Cash U 
Notes: The benefits in the gray-colored boxes are included in the analysis. Settlement incentives include local residence incentives and employment incentives.  







Table 1-2: Benefits included in calculating total benefit levels of the Non-Social Security Support across groups  
 Rental deposits Basic settlement money Additional settlement money Employment subsidies and 
employment incentives 
Able to work and Employed 
(AE) 
X X  X 
Able to work and 
Unemployed (AU)  
X X   
Unable to work and 
Unemployed (UU) 
X X X  































Table 1-3: Changes in benefit levels of the individual Non-Social Security Support for an NKD household living in Seoul, 1997-2019 
(Unit: %) 
 ∆ 1997-2004 ∆ 2005-2014 ∆ 2015-2019 
Basic settlement money -21.4% -80.8% 8% 
Additional settlement money -21.4% -3.9% -5.3% 
 Over 60 -21.4% -3.9% -5.3% 
 Disabled 
(Level 1-3 in decreasing 
order of severity) 
1 -21.3% -3.9% -5.3% 
2 -21.4% -3.9% -5.3% 
3 -21.5% -3.8% -5.3% 
 Long-term care patients -21.4% -3.8% -5.3% 
 Children of single parent -21.5% -3.8% -5.3% 
Rental deposits -21.4% 33.3% 16.5% 
Employment support - 195.4% -16.8% 
 Employment subsidies - 53.8% -100.0% 
Job training incentives - - -100.0% 
License acquisition incentives - - -100.0% 
Employment encouragement Incentives - - -5.3% 
Savings incentives - - 0% 
Notes: These are real benefits adjusted for inflation, estimated in 2019 CPI-KRW (unit: million). I calculate the differences between benefit levels of the year 
preceding the commencement of the reform period and the final year of the reform period.  
 
 
Table 1-4: Changes in benefit levels of the individual Social Security Support for an NKD household living in Seoul, 1997-2019 
 ∆ 1997-2004 ∆ 2005-2014 ∆ 2015-2019 
Livelihood benefits 0 Changes in existing benefits for households with the ability to work: 
1) Waiver of Ex.1.1 (Income eligibility), MCLX+1 => MCLX 
2) Reduction of Ex. 3 (Condition): Work requirement 5 years => 6 months 
3) Waiver of Ex. 4 (Benefit levels), 
(MCLX+1–pre-income) => (MCLX–pre-income) 
4) Reduction of the Ex. period, 5 years => 3 years 
0 
Medical benefits 0 Changes in existing benefits for employed households:  
1) Increases of Ex. 1.1. (Income eligibility), MCLX+1X120% => MCLX+1X400% 
2) Reduction of the Ex. period, no limit => 5 years 
Introduction of the NHI support 
1) Income eligibility: Below the average monthly household income for urban workers   
2) Benefit levels: Half of the insurance payments 
0 





Table 1-5: Changes in total benefit levels of the Non-Social Security Support for an NKD household living in Seoul by groups, 1997-
2019 (Unit: %) 
Notes: These are real benefits adjusted for inflation, estimated in the 2019 CPI-KRW (unit: million). AE group includes the Employed with High income (EH) 




Table 1-6: Changes in total benefit levels of the Social Security Support for an NKD household living in Seoul across groups, 1997-
2019 
 ∆ 1997-2004 ∆ 2005-2014 ∆ 2015-2019 
Employed with High income (EH) 0  ivelihood benefits ↓ (≈  20.2%a) 0 
Employed with High income (EL) 0 
 ivelihood benefits ↓ (≈  20.2%) 
Medical benefits ↑b 
(Level 1 (almost free) x 5 years, Half of the insurance payments) 
0 
Able to work and Unemployed (AU) 0  ivelihood benefits ↓ (≈  20.2%) 0 
Unable to work and Unemployed (UU) 0 0 0 
Notes: ↓ denotes decreases, ↑ denotes increases. a The calculation process is provided in ppendix 1 3. b Most of the EL group experiences increases in the 
medical benefits. However, it is hard to suggest changes in the rate because benefit levels were 0 for most of the    group prior to the reform. Details are 
provided in  ppendix 1 4. 
 ∆ 1997-2004 ∆ 2005-2014 ∆ 2015-2019 
Able to work and Employed (AE) 5.2% 7.0% -7.6% 
Able to work and Unemployed (AU) -21.4% -56.7% 13.6% 
Unable to work and Unemployed (UU) -21.4% -48.6% 8.4% 
- Over 60 -21.4% -49.3% 8.6% 
- Disabled 1 -21.4% -43.1% 5.4% 
- Disabled 2 -21.4% -46.3% 7.0% 
- Disabled 3 -21.4% -52.7% 10.8% 
- Long-term care patients -21.4% -47.3% 7.5% 





Appendix 1-1 (related to Table 1-5): Changes in total benefit levels of the Non-Social Security Support for an NKD household living 
in Seoul by groups, 1997−2019  
  Prior to  
Pro-Work 
Reforms 
1st Wave of  
Pro-Work 
Reforms 
2nd Wave of  
Pro-Work 
Reforms 
1997 2000 2005 2007 2009 2010 2013 2014 (2015*) 2019 
Characteristics  
- Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT)? 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT)? 
- If CCT, what kind of conditions? 
Basic settlement money 
(UCT) 
+ emp. subsidies 
Basic settlement money (UCT) + settlement incentives (CCT)  
conditioned on employment or participation in vocational training  
programs or job license acquisition + emp. subsidies 
Basic settlement money (UCT) + 
new settlement incentives  
(new CCT) conditioned on 




Basic settlement money (1) Introduced, 
28 




Over 60 (5.76) (5.76) (7.2) −> −> 7.2 −> 7.2 −> 
Disabled 1 (6.16) (6.16) (15.4) −> −> 15.4 −> 15.4 −> 
2 (4.32) (4.32) (10.8) −> −> 10.8 −> 10.8 −> 
3 (1.44) (1.44) (3.6) −> −> 3.6 −> 3.6 −> 
Long-term 
care patients 
(0.64/m) (0.64/m) (0.8/m) −> −> 0.8/m −> 0.8/m −> 
Children of 
single-parent 
(2.88) (2.88) (3.6) −> −> 3.6 −> 3.6 −> 
Children born 
overseas  
       4 (2017) −> 
Housing support Basic rental deposits (2) Introduced, 
Apt. <= 
50m2 or 7.5  
7.5 Apt. <= or 
85m2 or 
10 
13 −> −> −> −> 16 
Local residence incentives (3) . . . . Introduced, 
1.3/2.6 
−> −> −> -> 
Aggregate Housing support 7.5 -> 10 13 13/14.3/15.6 -> -> -> 16/17.3/18.6 
Emp.  
support 
Emp. subsidies (for employers)    Introduced, 
2year, up to 
12 (=0.5* 
24month) 
−> 2+1 years, up to 
18 
(=0.5*36month) 






Job training incentives . . Introduced, 
4.4 
−> −> Divided into  
basic−/additional−, 
2.4/2 
 asic−, 1.6 Abolished 
  
. 
License acquisition incentives . . Introduced, 
2 
−> −> −> −> Abolished  . 
Employment encouragement 
Incentives 
. . Introduced,  
9 




Savings incentives . . . . . . . Introduced, 




Limits on emp. protection periods 
(=Limits on the receipt of emp, 
subsidies) 
  6 months if 
failed to 
work for a 
period, one 
−> −> Deleted “6 
months  
of 
restriction if  
Suspension or  
termination of  
emp. protection if  
helping “their  
employers to  
−> Restriction on 
the payment of 
emp. subsidies 



















work for a 
period.” 
receive emp.  
subsidies by fraud 







fraud or other 
improper 
means.”  
Aggregate Employment support 
(4) 
0 12 27.4 39.4 39.4 40.4-42.4 44.9-49.9 20.9-25.9 20.9-25.9 
Notes: In preparing this table, I summarized information compiled and extrapolated from multiple data sources as mentioned in pp. 24-25. All cash benefits are 
measured in K W (unit: million); “→” denotes that there was no change. a Settlement Money includes basic settlement money, additional settlement money, 
settlement incentives, and due compensation. For Settlement incentives, please see employment incentives in emp. support column and local residence incentives 
in the housing support column. Due compensation was excluded from the benefit level calculation. b Regarding the benefit level of the additional settlement 
money, no data was available before 2010. Thus, I assumed that the benefit level of additional settlement money in absolute terms between 1997 and 2004 was 
80 percent relative to 2010, considering that the benefit level of additional settlement money has been 50 times of the monthly minimum cost of living since 2005 
(this has been 40 times of the monthly minimum cost of living before 2005). I assumed that the benefit level in absolute terms between 2005 and 2009 was as 
same as 2010, considering that there was no change between 2010 and 2019; there has been no comment on its change in the previous literature including 
government reports, which analyzed the policy trend. Also, among the vulnerable population receiving the additional settlement money, I excluded households 







Appendix 1-2 (related to Table 1-6): Changes in benefit levels of Social Security Support for households having X family members 
prior to the pro-work reforms: General vs. NKDs, 1997−2019  
  Livelihood Benefits Medical Benefits 
 General NKDs General NKDs 
 Before 2005 2005 2007  Before 2010.11.1 After 
2010.11.1 
2014 
Eligibility  1. Income 1.1 Household 
income must be 
less than the 
Minimum Cost of 
Living (MCL) for 
households having 







must be less than 












having a family 
member with 









must be less than the 
MCL for households 
having one additional 
family member, 
relative to the SK 
family members (i.e., 
household income < 




1.1., to 400% 
for the first five 





























income, Job training 
incentives, and 
other income are 
not exempted). 




(basic and additional 
settlement money), 
settlement incentives, 
and rental deposits 
are NOT counted as 
household income. 
(However, earned 
income, Job training 
incentives, and other 





2. There must be 
no obligatory 
provider (i.e., high-
income adult child) 
Exemption 2. The 
NKDs can become 
recipients regardless 
of the existence of 
an obligatory 
provider. 
(i.e., irrespective of 
the existence of a 
high-income adult 
child) 
 . 2. Same as the 
livelihood benefits 
Exemption 2. The 
NKDs can become 
recipients regardless 
of the existence of an 
obligatory provider. 
(i.e., irrespective of 




Conditions  3. Recipients need 
to participate in 
government-
sponsored work 
programs known as 
“self-support 
programs” 
Exemption 3.  
The NKD recipients 
are exempt from all 
work-required 
conditions for the 
first five years 
Reduction of 
Exemption 3, 
from the first 
five years to one 
year for 
households 
having a family 
Reduction of 
Exemption 3, 




3. Same as the 
livelihood benefits 
Exemption 3. The 
NKDs are exempt 
from all work-
required conditions 
for the first five 
years. Upon the 








Upon the expiration 
of the five-year 
exemption, NKDs 





the ability to 
work. 











 4. Calculated by 
the household 
income less the 
required MCL of X 
family members 





Calculated by the 
household income 
less the required 








Exemption 4 for 
households 
having a family 
member with 
the ability to 
work. 
 
 4. Medical benefit 
level 1 (almost free) 
is provided for 
households not 
having a family 
member with the 
ability to work; 
medical benefit level 
2 (co-pay) is 
provided for 
households having a 
family member with 
the ability to work. 
Exemption 4. 
Medical benefit level 
1 (almost free) is 
provided for all NKD 
households. 





  First five years  Reduction of 
the Exemption 
period,  





with the ability 
to work. 
 
 No limit  Limit to the 
first five years 










Appendix 1-3 (related to Table 1-6): Changes in the livelihood benefit levels of the NKD households through pro-work reforms 
Household size  
(persons) 
General householdsa NKD households 
Before 2005 After 2005 Change rateb 
1 401,466 668,504 401,466 -39.9% 
2 668,504 907,929 668,504 -26.4% 
3 907,929 1,136,332 907,929 -20.1% 
4 1,136,332 1,302,918 1,136,332 -12.8% 
5 1,302,918 1,477,800 1,302,918 -11.8% 
6 1,477,800 n.d.c 1,477,800 n.d. (-10%d) 
Avg.    (-20.2%e) 
Notes: a Below are benefit levels of the livelihood benefits by household size as of 2005 (Yeo et al., 2005). b The change rate is calculated by the formula: [1-
(benefit levels of ∆ 1997-2004 / benefit levels of ∆ 2005-2014)]x100. c There is no data for the livelihood benefits for households with a size greater than six 
persons. Therefore, I am unable to calculate the exact change rate; d I use -10% as a change rate for households having six persons, considering that the change 
rate decreases as the household size increases. e Using the change rate by household sizes, I estimated the average change rate.  
 
 
Appendix 1-4 (related to Table 1-6): Changes in the medical benefit levels of the NKD households through pro-work reforms 
 Based on household size 2 (as of 2010) Group Before 2010 After 2010 Changes  
0 <= HHIa <= 
MCLX+1X120% 
0 <= HHI <= 1,030,496b 
UU Level 1 (almost free) x lifetime 
Level 1 (almost free) x lifetime 
Half of NHI 
(-)e 
AU Level 1 (almost free) x lifetime 
Level 1 (almost free) x 5 yearsd 
Half of NHI 
-f 
EL Level 1 (almost free) x lifetime 
Level 1 (almost free) x 5 yearsd 
Half of NHI 
- 
MCLX+1X120% < HHI < 
Avg. income of urban 
workers 
1,030,496 < HHI <= 3,045,686c EL - 
Level 1 (almost free) x 5 years 
Half of NHI 
↑↑ 
Avg. income of urban 
workers < HHI <= 
MCLX+1X400% 
3,045,686 < HHI <=  
3,434,988 
EL - Level 1 (almost free) x 5 years ↑ 
HHI > MCLX+1X400% HHI > 3,434,988  EH - - - 
Notes: All monetary values are measured in KRW (unit: one). a HHI denotes household income. b As of 2010, the MCL for the household size of two is KRW 
858,747 (Yang, 2009) and 120% of it is KRW 1,030,496. c As of 2010, the average income of urban workers for the household size of two is KRW 3,045,686 
(KOSIS, n.d.b). d After five years, it will be changed to Level 2 (copay) if their household income is less than 100% of the MCL and none if their household 
income is 100% of the MCL or more. e Although half of the NHI payment is provided in addition to the existing the medical benefits, the actual amount of 
support is expected to be small since the medical fee is almost free for the UU group. f Considering the sum of the changes (the period in which medical care is 
free decreased from lifetime to 5 years, the possibility of being transferred to level 2 (co-pay), and the introduction of support in the form of half of the NHI 





Paper 2: Effects of the Pro-Work Reforms to the North Korean 
Defector Settlement Support System on the Economic Adjustment 
of North Korean Defectors in South Korea 
Abstract  
This study examines the effects of the pro-work reforms to  outh Korea’s North Korean 
Defectors (NKDs) settlement support system on the economic adjustment of NKDs in the 
country. It analyzes data from the 2010 National Survey of Domestic Violence: North Korean 
Defectors using a regression discontinuity design and o(logit) regression. The study finds that the 
reforms are not associated with changes in the economic adjustment of NKDs, measured by 
employment, household income level, a rate of cash transfer as the main source of income, and 
welfare receipt. The findings of this study suggest that policy changes must be based on data 
from outcome evaluations of the reforms. It also suggests that more comprehensive settlement 
support policies that consider non-economic factors such as physical and mental health or family 
characteristics are needed. 
 
Introduction  
As of September 2021, there were 33,800 North Korean Defectors (NKDs) living in 
South Korea (SK; Ministry of Unification [MOU], n.d.a). The South Korean (SK) government 
established the North Korean Defector Settlement Support System (NKDSSS) in 1997 to provide 
comprehensive settlement support to NKDs entering the country without any means of survival 
(MOU, n.d.c). This settlement support provides a minimum standard of living to NKDs who 





(the first five years an NKD is in SK), after which NKDs are expected to earn a living on their 
own.  
However, as the number of NKDs entering SK increased drastically from the mid-1990s 
to the mid-2000s, the NKDSSS became insufficient. Most NKDs rely on the National Basic 
 ivelihood  ecurity  ystem (N    ),  K’s primary public assistance program, and the 
NKDSSS has been criticized for encouraging welfare dependency among NKDs (Park, 2012). 
As a result, in 2005 the NKDSSS began to adopt a pro-work approach aimed at encouraging 
NKDs to support themselves, rather than focusing simply on providing cash assistance. In other 
words, the reform had the goal of reducing welfare receipt rates. 
In general, the pro-work policy reform shifted the program’s focus from Unconditional 
Cash Transfers (UCTs), which require means-testing alone, to Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) 
that require recipients to meet certain other conditions (Gao, 2017). Therefore, the debate over 
the pro-work policy reform trend has led to a more heated debate over cash transfers: UCTs 
versus CCTs. The first wave of pro-work reforms to the NKDSSS (introduced between 2005 and 
2014) also introduced various CCTs related to job preparation (i.e., job training incentives and 
license acquisition incentives) or employment (i.e, employment encouragement incentives) and 
increased the funding for CCTs while decreasing the funding for UCTs such as basic and 
additional settlement money. In late 2014, the second wave of pro-work reforms was initiated, 
which replaced the CCTs related to job preparation with the new CCT conditioned on 
employment and personal savings. The late 2014 reform was applied to NKDs who entered SK 
after November 29, 2014 (MOU, 2010–2019). 
Reviewing comparison studies of CCTs and UCTs, studies tend to focus on the effect of 





rather than economic outcomes (Baird et al., 2015). Even in studies that focus on behavioral 
outcomes, comparing the effects of UCTs and CCTs in developing countries is not easy, due to 
the fact that UCTs are mostly used in Africa while CCTs are mostly used in Latin America 
(Forget et al., 2013). Another challenge in comparing the effects of UCTs and CCTs is that 
conditioning levels may differ across the range of transfers from pure UCTs to completely 
monitored and imposed CCTs. Monitoring of CCT conditions can affect the effectiveness of the 
transfers, along with transfer size, recipient characteristics, and the baseline enrollment rate 
(Baird et al., 2015). In that regard, the pro-work reforms to the NKDSSS provide an opportunity 
to answer the difficult question of which is more effective, UCTs or CCTs. 
In the existing literature on the pro-work reforms to the NKDSSS and their economic 
outcomes, researchers have focused on the effects of specific employment support programs 
introduced as part of the reforms, such as job training programs, license acquisition support, and 
employment encouragement incentives. Findings from the body of literature show mixed effects 
of the pro-work reforms on the economic adjustment of NKDs. Specifically, existing studies 
have found that job training programs have either no effect or a negative effect (Kim, 2011; Kim 
& Baek, 2011; Lim & Kang, 2014; Park & Kim, 2008), licensure acquisition has either no effect 
or a positive effect (Kim & Baek, 2011; Park & Kim, 2008), and other employment support 
programs (employment subsidies, employment encouragement incentives, and job search 
support) have no effect or a positive effect (Kim, 2011; Kim & Baek, 2011; Lim & Kang, 2014; 
Park & Kim, 2008) on the economic adjustment of NKDs. However, no existing study has 
evaluated the effects of the pro-work reforms to the NKDSSS as a whole without focusing on 
specific employment support programs, limiting our understanding of whether the pro-work 





Meanwhile, the pro-work reforms to the NKDSSS are part of a global trend toward pro-
work policies. In 1996, the US replaced its traditional cash transfer program, Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC), with a pro-work program, Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF), which required work participation to receive cash benefits. The US also 
drastically expanded the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program. Welfare reforms in the US 
encouraged the UK and SK to adopt similar work-focused reforms in the late 1990s and 2000s, 
respectively. In South Korea, the NKDSSS adopted pro-work reforms in 2005 and the NBLSS 
did so in 2007.  
Considering that the NKDSSS offers greater benefits than the NBLSS (around $20,000 
per year per family compared to only $6000 per year per family29), a few studies have analyzed 
the effects of the pro-work reforms to the NKDSSS. This may be due to the lack of public data 
on the NKDSSS or a lack of interest on the part of researchers since the NKDSSS has a small 
number of recipients and is a non-universal program. More studies of the effects of the pro-work 
reforms to the NKDSSS are warranted.  
Regarding methods, most studies that have examined the pro-work reforms to the NBLSS 
or the K-EITC30 in SK have evaluated the impacts using a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
and/or a Difference In Difference (DID) design (Lee, 2015). However, when there is a definite 
cut-off point that determines program participation (e.g., age 18 or over or monthly household 
income of $2000 or less), there may be huge differences in the types and effect sizes of 
covariates between the treatment and control groups, which PSM and DID are unable to control 
well (Lee, 2015) since they are based on the assumption that types and effect sizes of covariates 
 
29 These are roughly estimated figures; see the MOU (2017). 
30 The K-EITC is a work-related income support system that provides work incentives to households with low-





are similar. To evaluate policies with clear cut-off points for participation, many studies use a 
regression discontinuity design (RDD), a robust quasi-experimental design (Carpenter & Dobkin, 
2011; Meng, 2013; Suarez & Cameron, 2020; Whetten et al., 2018). This is because the RDD 
confirms the policy effect using the discontinuity in the continuous relationship between the 
outcome variables and the treatment. This study employs the RDD to evaluate the effects of the 
pro-work reforms to the NKDSSS since the reforms were applied to NKDs who entered SK 
beginning in January 2005 (and not to those who entered before that month). 
As of 2018, the average monthly wage of NKDs (KRW 1,629,000) was 68.8% of the 
national average (KRW 2,368,000),31 the participation rate of NKDs in primary public assistance 
programs (24.4%) was 7.6 times that of the national rate (3.2%), and the school dropout rate for 
adolescents (2.1%) was 2.6 times that of the national rate (0.8%; MOU, n.d.a). These realities 
show that it is important to further improve the effectiveness of the NKDSSS.  
Analyzing data from the 2010 National Survey of Domestic Violence: Married32 NKDs, 
using an RDD for the primary analysis and an o(logit) regression for sensitivity analysis, this 
study answers a research question as follow: Did the pro-work reforms to the NKDSSS help 
improve the economic adjustment of NKDs in SK? Economic adjustment is measured using four 
proxies: 1) employment, 2) household income level, 3) cash transfers as the main source of 
income, and 4) welfare receipt. By evaluating the effects of pro-work reforms, this study aims to 
determine whether UCTs (CCTs) are more effective than CCTs (UCTs).  
 
31 All national average figures include the NKD population; however, because NKDs make up only 0.065% of the 
population, the national wage excluding the NKD population would be similar. 






The NKDSSS and Pro-Work Reforms 
The NKDSSS provides different types of support to NKDs in SK over three different 
stages: 1) their first three months in the country, 2) their first five years in the country, and 3) the 
period following their first five years. Specifically, during the first three months after NKDs 
arrive in SK, they are sent to a temporary settlement support center (called Hanawon), receive 
urgent settlement support, and take social adaptation courses. Afterward, they are assigned to 
public housing and start their lives in SK. For the first five years they are in SK, known as the 
“residence protection period,” NKDs are provided with the following types of settlement 
support: 1) settlement money, 2) housing, 3) employment, 4) social security (livelihood, medical, 
and national pension benefits), 5) education, 6) counseling, and 7) personal protection by the SK 
government (MOU, 2010–2019). As for social security support, the government provides many 
exemptions for NKDs so that they can enter the national welfare program more easily and enjoy 
more generous benefits.  
The NKDSSS has been criticized for incentivizing NKDs to continue depending on 
welfare benefits even after the residence protection period. For example, the participation rate of 
NKDs in the NBLSS was 74.1 percent in 2005, compared to a national participation rate of 3.1 
percent. In response, various pro-work reforms were made that changed the types, conditions, 
and benefit levels of settlement support (MOU, 2010–2019). Specifically, there have been two 
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waves of pro-work reforms: the first wave (2005–2014) introduced CCTs conditioned on 
employment (employment encouragement incentives) or job preparation activities (job training 
incentives and license acquisition incentives), while the second wave (2015–2019) replaced the 
CCTs conditioned on job preparation activities with CCTs conditioned on employment and 
savings (savings incentives; Table 1-2 & 1-3). 
It is important to note that the first wave of policy reforms consisted of many small pro-
work reforms that were introduced over time (in 2005, 2007, 2009, 2010, 2013, and early 2014). 
Among those reforms, the 2005 pro-work reform was the most important because it introduced 
major CCTs that were conditional on job preparation activities (job training and license 
acquisition incentives) or employment retention (employment encouragement incentives). It also 
decreased the funding for UCTs (basic and additional settlement money) and increased the 
funding for CCTs (employment incentives in settlement incentives) drastically. The 2007 pro-
work reform further increased the proportion of CCTs and the employment protection period33. 
The other reforms gradually strengthened the 2005 reform but did not further change the types, 
conditions, or benefit levels of settlement support.  
 
Literature Review  
The previous literature on the pro-work reforms to the NKDSSS and their economic 
outcomes have focused on the economic adjustment outcomes from the individual employment 
support programs introduced by the reforms (i.e., job training programs, license acquisition 
support, and employment encouragement incentives) or increased by them (i.e., employment 
 
33 The employment protection period is the period which NKDs are able to receive employment subsidies (Art. 3-2 






subsidies), but not the pro-work reforms themselves. In this section, I will review the previous 
studies that have examined the effects of employment support programs on economic adjustment 
outcomes. More information about the literature, including the sample sizes and methods of 
these studies, is provided in Table 2-1. 
Specifically, the literature has reported mixed results about the effects of the pro-work 
reforms on the economic adjustment of NKDs. Specifically, previous studies reported no effects 
or negative effects of job training programs (Kim, 2011; Kim & Baek, 2011; Lim & Kang, 2014; 
Park & Kim, 2008) no effects or positive effects of licensure acquisition (Kim & Baek, 2011; 
Park & Kim, 2008), and no effects or positive effects of the other employment support programs 
(employment subsidies, employment encouragement incentives, and job search support; Kim, 
2011; Kim & Baek, 2011; Lim & Kang, 2014; Park & Kim, 2008) on the economic adjustment 
of NKDs.  
Regarding the effect of job training programs on economic adjustment outcomes, most 
previous studies found no effects. Specifically, previous research has found that job training 
program participation has no effect on employment (Jeong, 2016; Kim, 2011; Kim, 2007; Kim & 
Baek, 2011; Lim & Kang, 2014; Park & Kim, 2008; and Jung et al., 2013 both in an all-women 
sample and a sample of women over 45), employment retention (Kim, 2011; Park & Kim, 2008), 
part-time work among the employed (Kim & Baek, 2011), work experience among the 
unemployed (Kim & Baek, 2011), individual earned income among the employed (Jeong, 2016; 
Kim & Baek, 2011), household income (Lim & Kang, 2014), and welfare receipt (Kim & Baek, 
2011). Jung et al. (2013) even suggested that job training program participation without license 
acquisition lowered employment among women under 45. Kim & Baek (2011), whose study 





job training incentives increased welfare receipt but did not affect employment, part-time work 
or individual earned income among the employed, or work experience among the unemployed.  
Regarding license acquisition incentives, most previous studies found they did not affect 
economic adjustment outcomes. Specifically, license acquisition incentives had no effect on 
employment (Jeong, 2016; Kim, 2007, Kim, 2011; Park & Kim, 2012), employment retention (S. 
Kim, 2012), individual earned income (Jeong, 2016), or welfare receipt (Kim & Baek, 2011). 
Only Kim and Baek (2011) found that license acquisition incentives increased employment, 
earned income (among the employed), and work experience (among the unemployed).  
Regarding the combined effects of job training program participation and license 
acquisition on economic adjustment outcomes, studies found no effect on employment (Jung et 
al., 2013; Kim & Baek, 2011). Specifically, Jung et al. (2013) found no effect of the combination 
on employment in an all-female sample. In the subset of women under 45, Jung et al. attributed 
the lack of effect to their having pre-school-aged children, and in the subset of women over 45, 
Jung et al. attributed the lack of effect to their prominent NK accent and poor health. Kim and 
Baek (2011) also reported no effect of the combination on individual earned income among the 
employed and work experience among the unemployed; however, this study suggested that the 
combination decreased part-time work among the employed and welfare receipt rates.  
Finally, regarding employment subsidies, employment encouragement incentives, and job 
search support (a job search counseling program, job fairs, and job-related programs), previous 
studies found mixed effects on the economic adjustment of NKDs. Specifically, employment 
subsidies were reported to increase employment (Park & Kim, 2012; Lim & Kang, 2014 in the 
long term) but not to increase employment retention (Park & Kim, 2012). As for the employment 





employment (Kim, 2011), increased the employment retention period (Kim, 2011; Park & Kim, 
2012), and decreased welfare receipt (Kim & Baek, 2011; Lim & Kang, 2014). However, two 
studies (Park & Kim, 2012; Lim & Kang, 2014) reported no effect of employment 
encouragement incentives. Regarding job search support, Kim and Baek (2011) reported that it 
did not increase employment or decrease the welfare receipt level but did increase work 
experience among the unemployed. 
Building on this body of existing literature, this paper investigates the effects of the pro-
work reforms on NKDs’ economic adjustment by analyzing 2010 national data on NKDs using 
an RDD for the main analysis and (o)logit regression methods for the sensitivity analysis. This 
study makes three contributions to the literature. First, it examines the impact of the pro-work 
reforms to the NKDSSS as a whole in order to evaluate whether the series of reforms were 
effective in promoting work and economic security and reducing welfare dependency among 
NKDs in SK. Second, using an RDD, this study estimates the causal effects of the pro-work 
reforms on NKDs’ economic adjustment in  K. The RDD allows us to compare the effects of 




Regression discontinuity design (RDD) 
This study evaluates the effect of the pro-work reforms on economic adjustment using an 
RDD based on the fact that all pro-work policies have been applied to NKDs who entered SK 
beginning January 1, 2005. RDD is a quasi-experimental design that estimates the causal effect 





a numeric rating (Jacob et al., 2012). A unique strength of RDD in comparison with PSM and/or 
DID methodologies is that RDD controls the effects of covariates well when there is a clear cut-
off point determining participation in the treatment group. Differences in some characteristics of 
the treatment and control groups may not be controlled well using PSM and/or DID 
methodologies when there is a clear cut-off point that determines program participation, causing 
potentially large differences in some characteristics of the two groups (McCary, 2007; Shadish et 
al., 2002). 
Specifically, a rating variable (sometimes called an assignment variable, forcing variable, 
or running variable) is a continuous variable that was measured before the treatment (Jacob et al., 
2012). A cut-off point (or threshold) is a point on the rating variable that divides the sample into 
a treatment group and a control group. The part of the sample that falls above (or below) the cut-
off point on the rating variable is then considered the treatment group, while the part below (or 
above) the cut-off point on the rating variable becomes the control group (Jacob et al., 2012). 
The rating variable in this study is the length of (NKDs’) residence (in  K) (in months), and the 
cut-off point is 67 months of residence (indicating entry into SK in January 2005). The treatment 
variable, pro-work reforms, is coded 1 if the length of residence is 67 months or less (i.e., if the 
NKD entered SK in January 2005 or thereafter) and coded 0 if the residency period is more than 
67 months (indicating that the NKD entered before January 2005). There are two types of RDD 
designs: sharp and fuzzy. A sharp RDD does not have no-shows (people assigned to the 
treatment group who do not receive the treatment) or crossovers (people assigned to the control 
group who do receive the treatment), while fuzzy RDD includes no-shows and/or crossovers 
(Jacob et al., 2012). This study employs sharp RDD because the treatment group (NKDs affected 





completely divided by the cut-off point (67 months of residency, indicating January 2005 entry) 
in the rating variable (length of residence).  
There are two strategies for specifying the functional form of the RDD correctly: the 
global strategy and the local strategy (Bloom, 2012). The global strategy focuses on choosing the 
model that best fits a given data set by exploring various functional forms (linear, linear 
interaction, quadratic, quadratic interaction, cubic, and cubic interaction). The local strategy 
focuses on choosing the right data to fit a given model by including only close observations on 
either side of the cut-off point (Jacob et al., 2012). This study incorporates both strategies. Using 
the global strategy, I choose functional forms for the RDD after exploring the various options, 
which I explain further in section 2.4.5 (Data analysis). Adopting the local strategy, I select two 
windows illustrated further in section 2.4.2 (Data). 
 
(O)logit regression 
As sensitivity analysis, (o)logistic analysis, is used to detect the effects of the pro-work 
reforms on NKDs’ economic adjustment.  n detail, logit regression is performed for three proxies 
of economic adjustment (employment, cash transfers as the main income source, and welfare 
receipt), which are dummy variables. Ordered logistic regression is performed for one measure 
of economic adjustment, household income level, an ordinal variable. A test of the 
proportionality of the odds showed that the proportional odds assumption is met and therefore an 
ordered logistic regression is the right choice (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group, n.d.). 
 
Data 





the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (MOGEF), which was collected by the Yonsei 
University School of Social Welfare. The primary aim of the 2010 data was to collect 
information on domestic violence in NKD households; thus, it only includes NKDs who are/were 
couples (married; cohabiting; or separated, divorced, or bereaved). Nevertheless, I decided to use 
this dataset because it has a variety of variables related to the employment support programs 
created by the pro-work reforms, it includes information on NKDs’ economic adjustment, 
education, and demographics, it did not specifically target domestic violence victims among 
NKDs. It employed the snowball sampling method, which has advantages when investigating 
marginalized, hard-to-reach populations because otherwise, it would be hard to achieve such a 
sample size of NKDs using random selection when limited by time and money. To alleviate the 
shortcomings of snowball sampling, only one person per household was allowed to respond (the 
first to volunteer during the survey). The instrument is a self-administered questionnaire.  
This dataset has 302 participants,34 and entry years for the entire sample range from April 
1948 to August 2010. For the RDD, I use two windows: 1) a 2000/2010 window (N = 282) and 
2) a 2001/2008 window (N = 251).  
I chose the 2000/2010 window (±5 years from the cut-off point, 2005) to start the RDD 
after dropping respondents whose entry year was before 2000 when the NKRPSSA introduced 
employment subsidies. I then narrowed down the window to 2001/2008 (±3 years from the cut-
off point, 2005), which is the narrowest window that maintains a reasonably large sample size. 
Because temporary settlement money is provided during the first year after entry, recent arrivals’ 
outcomes could interfere with the effect of the policy reforms. Indeed, Figure 2-1 and Appendix 
2-1 show that the outcomes of recent arrivals (since 2009) are outliers in the relationship 
 
34 This data does not include unmarried NKDs since the main purpose of the 2010 dataset was to investigate 





between economic adjustment and length of residence. In addition, through descriptive 
diagnostic analysis, I find that outliers may emerge if the residence period is too short (10 
months or less, entering after October 2009) or too long (163 months or more, entering before 
January 1997). Therefore, I use the 2001/2008 window as the primary analysis to drop such 
outliers. 
Of potential concern is a relatively small sample size and whether it is sufficient to 
estimate regression models that answer the research questions. I use two approaches to conduct  a 
power analysis and both suggest that, despite the sample size being relatively small, it is 
sufficient for the analysis in this study. Specifically, following Cattaneo et al. (2019), a power 
analysis suggests that the ideal sample size for this study is 308 with an effect size of 0.5, which 
is close to the full sample size of the dataset (N=302) and slightly higher than the sample size for 
global analysis (N=282) and local analysis (N=251). Following Raosoft (n.d.), another power 
analysis estimates that the ideal sample size for this research is 377 out of a population of 20,000 
(as of 2010), a margin of error of 5% at a confidence level of 95%. With a reduced sample size of 
251, the margin of error is slightly higher at 6.15% if the confidence level is maintained at 95%. 
These estimates suggest that the sample size of this study, despite being relatively small, is within 




This study examines the effects of economic adjustment using four proxies: employment 
(dummy variable: 1 = employed, 0 = unemployed), household income level (ordered variable: 0 





or more), cash transfers (settlement support or welfare) as the main income source (dummy 
variable: 1 = yes, 0 = no), and welfare receipt (dummy variable: 1 = receiving welfare, 0 = not 
receiving welfare). Cash transfers as the main income source is measured by whether self-
reported cash transfers (either settlement support or welfare or both) are the main income source 
in respondents’ households. Welfare receipt asks whether the respondents received any welfare 
benefits regardless of the benefit levels. 
The rating variable, which is used to assign subjects to the treatment (pro-work NKDSSS 
participants) and the control group (previous NKDSSS participants) in the RDD, is the length of 
residence (unit: months), calculated using two variables, entry year and entry month.  
 The treatment variable, pro-work reforms (dummy variable: 1 if an NKD has resided in 
SK for 67 months or less [their entry date was in 2005 or later]; 0 if an NKD has resided in SK 
longer than 67 months [their entry date was before 2005]), is generated using the rating variable, 
length of residence, and the cut-off point, January 1, 2005.  
 
Covariates  
Covariates include female (dummy variable: 1 = female, 0 = male), respondents’ age 
(young [20 to 34], middle-aged [35 to 49], older [50 to 75]), education (less than high school, 
high school, 2-year college or more), self-rated physical health (very poor, poor, moderate, good 
or very good), self-rated mental health (very poor, poor, moderate, good or very good), marital 
status (married, cohabiting, separated/divorced/bereaved), child(ren) in the household, spouse’s 
nationality (NK, SK, third country), location of residence (Seoul, other metropolitan cities). 
Conceptually, the RDD does not need to include control variables because it controls the 





assume similar characteristics between treatment and control groups. Rather, it admits there is a 
difference that appears as a function of the rating variable35. What the RDD examines is whether 
there is any discontinuity or change in the pattern of the relationship at certain points where they 
are not expected without artificial intervention (i.e., policy reforms). This study also confirms 
that there is no non-outcome variable that affects the results. However, empirically, RDD is often 
run again after adding covariates in order to increase the precision of the treatment effect 
(Frölich & Huber, 2019). Therefore, this study runs the RDD both without and with the 
covariates. 
 
Conditions of the RDD  
For the RDD to have internal validity, four conditions must be satisfied. Here, I describe 
the four conditions and state whether they are met: The first condition is that the rating variable 
should not be influenced by the treatment.  n this study, the length of NKDs’ residence in  K is 
not influenced by the pro-work reforms. The second condition is that the cut-off point should not 
be decided by external factors independent of the rating variable. In this study, I confirmed there 
is no manipulation of the ratings near the cut-off point in a graph showing the density of the 
rating variable, length of residence (Figure 2-1). The third condition is that no other factors 
besides the treatment create discontinuity at the cut-off point. In this study, I found no 
discontinuity at the cut-off point caused by any non-outcome variable. The last condition is that 
the functional form, f(R), indicating the relationship between the outcome variable and the rating 
variable, should be specified precisely. The functional form should also be continuous except for 
the interval without the treatment (Jacob et al., 2012). To decide on the functional form, I test six 
 
35 The RDD in this study is based on the positive relationship between economic adjustment outcomes and the 





models (linear, linear interaction, quadratic, quadratic interaction, cubic, and cubic interaction) 
and perform graphical analysis of them (Appendix 2-1 & 2-2). I then selected the cubic model 
for the 2000/2010 window and the quadratic model for the 2001/2008 window according to the 
rule-of-thumb F-test of the six models and the results from the subsequent graphical analysis, as 
suggested in Jacob and Zhu (2012), and use the same functional form throughout the models. I 
also confirm that the functional forms are discontinuous only at the cut-off point. 
  
Data analysis 
First, the t-test is performed to analyze the demographic characteristics and dependent 
variables of the entire sample and to detect group differences between the treatment and control 
groups. 
Second, as the main analysis, a sharp RDD is performed for the research question on the 
effects of the pro-work reforms on NKDs’ economic adjustment. The identification strategy for 
the RDD is as follows: 
Economic adjustmenti = (x) + α1Ti + α2 f(R)i + εi 
where:  
•  conomic adjustmenti = the proxies of economic adjustment (employment, household 
income level, cash transfers as the major income source, and welfare receipt) for 
observation i; 
• (x) = a set of pre-determined characteristics of observation i; 
• Ti = 1 if observation i is allocated to the treatment group and 0 otherwise; 
• f( )i = various functional forms (linear, linear interaction, quadratic, quadratic 





assignment and outcome variables for observation i (Jacob et al., 2012, p. 22 for more 
information); and  
• εi = a random error in the regression. 
 
  Third, RDD graphical analysis is carried out to find the functional form that best fits the 
relationship between the NKDs’ economic adjustment and their length of residence in  K and to 
visualize the effect size of the findings from the RDD.  
Fourth, (o)logistic analysis are performed as sensitivity analysis with a model for each 
research question. The identification strategy for the (o)logistic analysis are as follows: 
Economic adjustmenti = x + γ1Ti + ɤ2 femalei
 + εi 
 To summarize, this study uses the 2000/2010 window (±5 years from the cut-off point, 
2005) and the 2001/2008 window (±3 years from the cut-off point, 2005). A cubic model is 
selected as the functional form for the 2000/2010 window while a quadratic model is selected for 
the 2001/2008 window. All models are run with and without covariates. Finally, a quadratic 
model for the 2001/2008 window with covariates (Column 4) is used as the primary analysis, 
considering that: 1) the 2001/2008 window is chosen using the local strategy as well as the  
global strategy; 2) the quadratic model fits the window best; 3) adding covariates increases the 




The descriptive statistics of the samples are provided in Table 2-2 (2000/2010 window, N 
= 282). Column (1) presents the descriptive statistics of the full sample, Column (2) the control 





Column (4) the t-test results from the comparison between the treatment and control groups. In 
this section, I interpret the results in Column (1) and Column (4) and interpret the results in 
Columns (2) and (3) only if statistically significant differences are revealed through the t-tests in 
Column (4). 
The descriptive statistics of the economic adjustment outcomes for the full sample are 
found in Column (1). The employment rate among NKDs is 45.1%, 13.8 percentage points less 
than the national employment rate (58.9%) in 2010 (Korean Statistical Information Service 
[KO   ], n.d.). Regarding monthly household income level, 14.9% of the NKDs have no 
monthly household income; 34.8% have less than K W 1 million; 37.0% have between K W 1 
million and 2 million; 13.4% have more than KRW 2 million. The average monthly household 
income of NKDs is at the 2.49 level (between KRW 0 and KRW 2 million), less than the 
national average monthly household income of around KRW 4 million (Bank of Korea, n.d.). 
Cash transfers (either N     or NKD   ) are the main income source for 44% of the NKDs, 
and 50.6% of the NKDs receive welfare (based on NBLSS participation rate), 16 times the 
national NBLSS participation rate (3.1%) in 2010 (Statistics Korea, n.d.). 
Next, reviewing the descriptive statistics of the non-economic adjustment outcomes, the 
average length of residence in SK is 55.75 months, and 65.6% of the respondents are women.36 
The largest age group is middle-aged (35 to 49, 60.6%), followed by young (20 to 34, 23.7%), 
then by older (50 to 75, 15.7%). The most common education level is high school (60.6%), 
followed by less than high school (23.7%), then 2-year college or more (22.3%). Regarding self-
 
36 In further analysis, significant differences in the age distribution of female and male NKDs are found with this 
sample. A larger proportion of the women fall into the youngest group (age 20 to 34) compared to the men (23.6% 
of the female respondents and 9.8% of the male ones). A smaller proportion of women fall into the middle-aged 
group compared to the men (61.0% of the women and 72.5% of the men). The percentages who fall into the older 





rated physical health, the most common rating is moderate (38.3%), followed by poor (28.1%), 
very poor (21.9%), then good or very good (11.7%). Regarding self-rated mental health, the most 
common rating is moderate (42.7%), followed by poor (30.7%), very poor (13.5%), then good or 
very good (13.1%). In terms of marital status, 66.1% of participants are married, 20.6% are 
cohabiting, and 13.4% are separated, divorced, or bereaved. The percentage of participants living 
with at least one child is 74.2 percent.  pouse’s nationality is most commonly NK (66.3%), 
followed by SK (13.9%), then a third country (19.8%). Lastly, 72.0% of respondents lived in 
Seoul. 
Finally, Column (4) shows the t-test results for the pro-work reforms. The welfare receipt 
rate of the treatment group (54.9%) is 12.3 percentage points higher than the control group 
(42.6%, p < 0.1). NKDs in the treatment group had resided in SK an average of 47 months less 
than those in the control group (38.90 months compared to 85.89 months, p < 0.001). The 
percentage of those in the treatment group who had less than a high school education (32.7%) is 
15.5 percentage points higher than in the control group (17.2%, p < 0.01). Finally, the percentage 
of those in the treatment group whose spouses’ nationality is neither  K nor NK (23.9%) is 19.8 
percentage points higher than in the control group (12.4%, p < 0.05). 
 
Effects of the pro-work policy reform on economic adjustment 
This section first presents the effects of the pro-work policy reform on the economic 
adjustment of NKDs using RDD (Table 2-3 & Figure 2-1) and (o)logit regression (Table 2-4), 
with the pro-work reforms measured as post-reform versus pre-reform. The results show that the 
pro-work reforms to the NKDSSS had no statistically significant effect on the economic 





Table 2-3 presents the RDD regression results for the effects of the pro-work reforms to 
the NKDSSS (post-reform versus pre-reform) on the economic adjustment of NKDs. Column (1) 
is estimated from the 2000/2010 window without covariates; Column (2) from the 2000/2010 
window with covariates; Column (3) from the 2001/2008 window without covariates; and 
Column (4) from the 2001/2008 window with covariates. The last five rows indicate whether or 
not each column includes a rating variable, a quadratic term in the rating variable, a cubic term in 
the rating variable, and covariates.  
Figure 2-1 presents plots of changes in economic adjustment outcomes on the Y-axis 
alongside the length of residence (in months) on the X-axis with samples from the 2000/2010 
window and the 2001/2008 window. Each dot is the mean change in economic adjustment 
outcomes. The continuous line indicates predicted values from a cubic function (2000/2010 
window) and a quadratic function (2001/2008 window) among the f(R). This is done separately 
for the treatment group (who had resided in SK 67 months or less, on the left) and the control 
group (who had resided in SK more than 67 months, on the right).  
Table 2-4 presents the (o)logit regression results on the effects of the pro-work reforms to 
the NKDSSS on the economic adjustment of NKDs.  
Reviewing Table 2-3 and 2-5, the effects of the pro-work reforms on NKDs’ economic 
adjustment are as follows: First, regarding employment, household income level, and cash 
transfers as the main income source, no effects of the pro-work reforms are reported throughout 
all tables. Figure 2-1 also confirms these findings. Looking at the dots, no figure shows a large 
gap between the economic adjustment outcomes of the treatment and control groups at the 
threshold of 67 months (January 2005). This means that the pro-work reforms had no effect on 





In summary, I conclude that there are no statistically significant effects of the pro-work 
reforms on economic adjustment outcomes, considering the RDD outcomes from the 2001 and 
2008 window with covariates (Column (4) in Table 2-3), which I use as the primary analysis. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion  
 This study examines the effects of the pro-work reforms on NKDs’ economic adjustment, 
using the 2010 National Survey of Domestic Violence: Married NKDs. A sample of 282 NKDs 
from the data was analyzed for the 2000/2010 window and 251 NKDs for the 2001/2008 
window, and RDD was used for the primary analysis while (o)logit regression was used for 
sensitivity analysis.  
This study finds that the pro-work reforms do not affect economic adjustment, measured 
in terms of employment, household income level, the rate at which cash transfers are the main 
source of income, and welfare receipt rates. Therefore, it is hard to say that the pro-work reforms 
to the NKDSSS achieved their goal of improving economic adjustment among NKDs compared 
to previous policies. The findings of this study align with those of previous studies, in that the 
different outcomes of the individual employment support programs (mixed [no or negative] 
effects of job training programs and mixed [no or positive] effects of licensure acquisition and 
other employment support programs) can cancel each other out. These results suggest that there 
are no significant differences in the economic adjustment outcomes of UCTs and CCTs, as 
suggested by the previous literature that compared behavioral outcomes of UCTs and CCTs.  
In order for the NKDSSS to be effective, several aspects of it can be improved. First, 
there should be rigorous policy evaluations for its reforms to improve the NKDSSS. In reviewing 





increased significantly. Specifically, employment rate increased by 1.2% (from 41.9% in 2005 to 
43.1% in 2010); unemployment rate decreased by 17% (from 23.5% in 2005 to 6.5% in 2010); 
welfare receipt rate decreased by 22.8% (from 74.1% in 2005 to 51.3% in 2010) (Statistics 
Korea, n.d., KO   , n.d.a, as cited in Park, 2011).  
These indicators might suggest that the first wave of pro-work reforms was successful. 
However, findings from this study reveal that there is a high likelihood that the changes came 
from other factors other than the pro-work reforms (i.e., increases in the residence length of the 
entire NKD population). It is noteworthy that the economic indicators of NKDs have improved 
regardless of the contributing factors. However, considering that the government expenditure for 
the NKDSSS is high and that all recent arrivals are affected by policy changes, which will affect 
their lives in SK, a rigorous policy evaluation for its reforms is warranted, which is a basis of 
evidence-based policy.  
 Second, the effects of health and family factors (i.e., marital status, parenthood, and 
spouse’s nationality) have not been sufficiently investigated, given that these are some of the 
most influential factors in the economic adjustment of NKDs. Increasing the employment rate 
may not be the only way to increase NKDs’ economic adjustment.  ncreasing their human capital 
(i.e., physical and mental health or family support) may lead to increases in their employment 
rates and economic adjustment. Therefore, more comprehensive settlement support policies that 
consider non-economic factors are needed. 
This study has several limitations that can be addressed by future research. First, this 
study has a relatively small sample size, which is shared by most of the other national data on 
NKDs. Future research can address this limitation by adopting various sampling methods to 





the data collection methods used. The 2010 data was collected using convenience sampling, 
which makes it difficult to generalize since the sample does not represent the whole population 
and bias cannot be measured (Bornstein et al., 2017). However, the averages of key variables in 
this data are similar to national data collected using simple random sampling and larger sample 
sizes.  or example, rates of employment and welfare receipt among the sample in this study are 
45.1% and 50.6%, respectively, while the 2017  conomic and  ocial  ntegration  urvey of 
NKDs that used simple random sampling (N = 415) reported rates of 43.1% and 51.3%, 
respectively.  inally, the current study only includes NKDs who are or were part of a couple 
since it was designed to study domestic violence among NKDs. Therefore, it is hard to 
generalize the results from this study to single NKDs. Future research can address these 
limitations by employing data with a larger sample size, using random sampling, and not limiting 











Figure 2-2: Graphs plotting the relationship between the economic adjustment and the residential 
period  






Cash transfers as 








Covariates N N 
Notes: The figures present the plots of changes in economic adjustment outcomes (Y-axis) by the length of 
residence (months, X-axis) using samples from the 2000/2010 window and the 2001/2008 window. Each dot is the 
mean change in economic adjustment outcomes. The continuous line indicates the predicted values from the cubic 
(2000/2010 window) and linear (2001/2008 window) functions among the f(R) for the treatment (length of 
residence<=67 months, left side) and comparison (length of residence >67 months, right side) groups. Looking at 
the dots, no large gap in economic adjustment outcomes is found between the treatment and comparison groups at 
the 67-month threshold (entry in January 2005).  
 
 





Table 2-1: Information on previous literature 
Article Proxies of economic adjustment Data (Sample size) Methods 
Kim 
(2007) 
- Employment - 2003 survey of the Korea Research 
Institute for Vocational Education and 
Training (KRIVET) (N=200) 







- Duration of work 
- Duration of unemployment 
period 
- Merged data which combined data from 
the HRD-net, a database of the MOEL, a 
database of employment insurance, and data 
from the NKD support groups (N=3650) 
- Logistic 
regression 




- Employment offering four 
major insurances (Health 
insurance, national pension, 
employment insurance, 
workers' compensation)  
- Employment retention period 
during the last five years. 
- Merged data which combines the Ministry 
of Unification (MOU) data (2005 enterers) 
with the employment insurance database of 
the Ministry of Employment and Labor 
(MOEL) for quantitative analysis (N=1214) 
- Self-surveyed data with the interview for 
qualitative analysis (N=20) 












- Employment  
- Welfare receipt 
- 2009 NKDs Economic Activity Survey of 






- Employment  
- Duration of work 
- Merged data from the survey conducted by 
the 2010 Ewha Institute of Unification 
Studies (EIUS) with the DB of employment 
subsidies and employment encouragement 














- Job training program 
participation 
- License acquisition 




- Job security 
- Welfare receipt  
- 2005−2012 Economic activity trends of 
NKDs from the Database Center for North 
Korean Human Rights (NKDB) 





 - 2016 Survey on Education Status of 







- Individual income 
- 2016  urvey on NKD’  daptation to 








- Job stability   
- Household income 
- 2015 Self-surveyed data (N=485) - Logistic 








Table 2-2: Descriptive statistics by pre- versus post- pro-work reforms 
















Dependent variables           
 
Employed (ref: unemployed)  45.1% (0.499) 44.3% (0.500) 45.6% (0.500) 
 
Household income level  2.49 (0.904) 2.55 (0.936) 2.46 (0.888) 
 
1) No income 14.9% (0.356) 14.4% (0.353) 15.1% (0.359) 
 
2) 0-1M KRW 34.8% (0.477) 33.0% (0.473) 35.8% (0.481) 
 
3) 1-2M KRW 37.0% (0.484) 36.1% (0.483) 37.4% (0.485) 
 
4) 2M+ KRW 13.4% (0.341) 16.5% (0.373) 11.7% (0.323) 
 
Cash transfers as the main income source 
(ref: other income as the main income 
source) 
44.4% (0.498) 41.1% (0.495) 46.1% (0.500) 
 
Welfare receipt (ref: no welfare receipt) 50.6% (0.501) 42.6% (0.497) 54.9% (0.499) † 
Rating variable        
Length of residence (unit: months) (cont.) 55.75 (27.248) 85.89 (13.164) 38.90 (16.341) *** 
Covariates             
 
Female (ref: male)  65.6% (0.476) 65.3% (0.478) 65.7% (0.476)  
Age (cont.)  40.98 (8.989) 40.65 (9.085) 41.16 -(8.956) 
 
1) 20 to 34  23.7% (0.426) 24.7% (0.434) 23.2% (0.423) 
 
2) 35 to 49 60.6% (0.490) 58.8% (0.495) 61.6% (0.488) 
 
3) 50 to 75 15.7% (0.364) 16.5% (0.373) 15.3% (0.361) 
 
Education level         
1) Less than high school 27.3% (0.446) 17.2% (0.379) 32.7% (0.471) ** 
2) High school 50.4% (0.501) 57.0% (0.498) 46.8% (0.500) 
 
3) 2-year college or more  22.3% (0.417) 25.8% (0.440) 20.5% (0.405) 
 
Self-rated physical health        
1) Very poor 21.9% (0.414) 20.8% (0.408) 22.5% (0.419) 
 
2) Poor 28.1% (0.450) 29.2% (0.457) 27.5% (0.448) 
 
3) Moderate  38.3% (0.487) 37.5% (0.487) 38.8% (0.489) 
 
4) Good or very good 11.7% (0.322) 12.5% (0.332) 11.2% (0.317) 
 
Self-rated mental health         
1) Very poor 13.5% (0.342) 11.5% (0.320) 14.6% (0.354) 
 
2) Poor 30.7% (0.462) 34.4% (0.477) 28.7% (0.453)   
3) Moderate  42.7% (0.496) 39.6% (0.492) 44.4% (0.498)   
4) Good or very good 13.1% (0.338) 14.6% (0.355) 12.4% (0.330)   
Marital status         
1) Married 66.1% (0.474) 66.3% (0.475) 65.9% (0.475)   
2) Cohabiting 20.6% (0.405) 19.4% (0.397) 21.2% (0.410)   
3) Separated, divorced, or bereaved 13.4% (0.341) 14.3% (0.352) 12.8% (0.336)   
Child(ren) in the household (ref: no 
child(ren) in the household) 
74.2% (0.438) 73.1% (0.446) 74.9% (0.435)   
 pouse’s nationality         
1) NK 66.3% (0.474) 69.1% (0.465) 64.8% (0.479)   
2) SK 13.9% (0.347) 18.6% (0.391) 11.4% (0.318)   
3) Third country 19.8% (0.399) 12.4% (0.331) 23.9% (0.427) * 
Living in Seoul (ref: not living in Seoul)  72.0% (0.450) 72.0% (0.451) 72.0% (0.450)   
Notes: 1,000 KRW is approximately 1 USD. Standard deviations are in parentheses. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **<0.01, 





Table 2-3: RDD results on the effects of pro-work reforms of the NKDSSS on the economic adjustment of NKDs  
 2000/2010 window 2001/2008 window 








Employment             
Pro-work reforms -0.871 (0.656)  -0.852 (0.839)  -0.386 (0.561)  -0.683 (0.738)  
Obs.  241   202   212   212  
Prob > Chi2  0.3472   0.0192   0.0104   0.0117  
R2  0.0134   0.1315   0.3838   0.4863  
Household income level             
Pro-work reforms -0.864 (0.550)  -0.806 (0.666)  -0.410 (0.478)  -0.627 (0.606)  
Obs.  270   219   240   240  
Prob > Chi2  0.1015   0.0000   0.0026   0.0032  
R2  0.0112   0.1449   0.6585   0.7458  
Cash transfers as the main 
income source 
            
Pro-work reforms 0.670 (0.601)  0.981 (0.818)  0.116 (0.528)  0.310 (0.668)  
Obs.  269   217   239   239  
Prob > Chi2  0.1331   0.0006   0.0258   0.0265  
R2  0.0191   0.1626   0.0376   0.0697  
Welfare receipt             
Pro-work reforms 0.986 (0.643)  0.597 (0.785)  0.230 (0.552)  0.988 (0.725)  
Obs.  263   213   233   233  
Prob > Chi2  0.0158   0.1002   0.0298   0.0386  
R2  0.0335   0.1003   0.0222   0.1410  
Rating variable (R)  Y   Y   Y   Y  
Quadratic in rating variable (R2)  Y   Y   Y   Y  
Cubic term in rating variable 
(R3) 
 Y   Y   N   N  
Covariates  N   Y   N   Y  




Table 2-4: (O)Logit regression results on the effects of pro-work reforms of the NKDSSS on the economic adjustment of NKDs   
Employed  
(logit)  
Household income level 
(ologit) 
Cash transfers as the 
main income source 
(logit) 
Welfare receipt   
(logit) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pro-work reforms (base: 2000-
2004) 
T (2005 to 2010) 0.043 (0.337)  -0.204 (0.281)  0.403 (0.337)  0.606 (0.322) † 
Female (base: male) -1.284 (0.370) ** -0.827 (0.306) ** 0.852 (0.371) * 0.502 (0.350)  
Age (base: 35 to 49) 20 to 34 -0.544 (0.411)  -0.352 (0.332)  0.347 (0.396)  0.262 (0.377)  
  50 to 75 0.119 (0.440)  0.084 (0.366)  0.432 (0.435)  0.358 (0.420)  
Education (base: high school) Under high school 0.030 (0.382)  -0.431 (0.318)  -0.127 (0.382)  -0.257 (0.361)  
  2-year college or more 0.627 (0.406)  0.142 (0.338)  -0.294 (0.408)  0.018 (0.386)  
Physical health (base: moderate) Very poor -1.008 (0.576) † -1.287 (0.470) ** 0.683 (0.520)  0.688 (0.496)  
  Poor -0.339 (0.428)  -0.905 (0.361) * 0.483 (0.414)  0.815 (0.399) * 
  Good or very good -0.161 (0.567)  -0.552 (0.447)  0.352 (0.555)  0.435 (0.546)  
Mental health (base: moderate) Very poor -0.315 (0.692)  -0.705 (0.540)  1.662 (0.640) ** 0.762 (0.599)  
  Poor -0.522 (0.412)  -0.340 (0.340)  0.625 (0.396)  0.069 (0.376)  
  Good or very good -0.065 (0.556)  0.068 (0.430)  -0.113 (0.531)  -0.356 (0.526)  
Marital status (base: cohabiting) Married 0.399 (0.419)  1.530 (0.369) *** -0.877 (0.404) * -0.564 (0.392)  
  Separated, divorced, 
bereaved 
-0.001 (0.634)  -0.555 (0.521)  0.545 (0.616)  0.323 (0.598)  
Child(ren) in the household 
(base: no child(ren) in the 
household) 
  -0.745 (0.403) † -0.643 (0.317) * 0.797 (0.392) * 0.713 (0.372) † 
 pouse’s nationality (base: NK) SK 0.402 (0.505)  0.846 (0.424) * -0.218 (0.494)  0.090 (0.474)  
  Third country 0.013 (0.430)  0.405 (0.343)  -0.266 (0.412)  -0.138 (0.399)  
Living in Seoul (base: living in other metropolitan cities) 0.123 (0.352)  0.000 (0.296)  0.152 (0.346)  -0.081 (0.326)  
/cut1      -3.159 (0.593)        
/cut2      -0.926 (0.549)        
/cut3      1.483 (0.554)        
_Cons   1.170 (0.661) †    -1.956 (0.686) ** -1.475 (0.636) * 
Obs.    204   221   219   215  
Prob > Chi2 
 
 0.0094   0.0000   0.0004   0.1040  
R2    0.1251   0.1361   0.1489   0.0867  









Appendix 2-1: Graphs plotting the relationship between the outcome and the rating variable (2000/2010 window) 
P Employment Household income level Cash transfers  
as the main income source 
Welfare receipt 
1 
    
2 
    
3 
    
Notes: Figures present the plots of changes in economic adjustment outcomes (Y-axis) with the length of residence (months, X-axis) using samples from the 
2000/2010 window. Each dot is the mean of changes in economic adjustment outcomes. The continuous line indicates the predicted values from a various (linear, 
quadratic, and cubic) function among the f(R) for the treatment (length of residence<=67 months, left side) and comparison (length of residence >67 months, 
right side). Looking at the dots in the figures, no large gap in economic adjustment outcomes is found between the treatment and comparison groups at the 67- 
month threshold (entry in January 2005). 




Appendix 2-2: Graphs plotting the relationship between the outcome and the rating variable (2001/2008 window) 
P Employment Household income level Cash transfers  
as the main income source 
Welfare receipt 
1 
    
2 
    
3 
    
Notes: Figures present the plots of changes in economic adjustment outcomes (Y-axis) with the length of residence (months, X-axis) using samples from the 
2001/2008 window. Each dot is the mean of changes in economic adjustment outcomes. The continuous line indicates the predicted values from a various (linear, 
quadratic, and cubic) function among the f(R) for the treatment (length of residence<=67 months, left side) and comparison (length of residence >67 months, 
right side). Looking at the dots in the figures, no large gap in economic adjustment outcomes is found between the treatment and comparison groups at the 67- 
month threshold (entry in January 2005). 








Household income level 
(ologit) 
(2) 
Cash transfers as the 
main income source 
(logit) 
(3) 
Welfare receipt   
(logit) 
(4) 
Pro-work reforms (base: 2000-
2004) 
T1 (2005 to 2006) 0.038 (0.419)  -0.144 (0.338)  0.572 (0.409)  0.661 (0.391) † 
  T2 (2007 to 2010) 0.047 (0.374)  -0.250 (0.317)  0.284 (0.374)  0.567 (0.357)  
Female (base: male) -1.284 (0.370) ** -0.832 (0.306) ** 0.850 (0.372) * 0.501 (0.350)  
  -0.544 (0.411)  -0.346 (0.332)  0.359 (0.398)  0.266 (0.378)  
  0.118 (0.443)  0.096 (0.368)  0.456 (0.436)  0.366 (0.421)  
Education (base: high school) Under high school 0.031 (0.382)  -0.437 (0.318)  -0.138 (0.383)  -0.259 (0.361)  
  2-year college or more 0.627 (0.406)  0.135 (0.339)  -0.311 (0.409)  0.014 (0.386)  
Physical health (base: moderate) Very poor -1.006 (0.586) † -1.311 (0.476) ** 0.632 (0.525)  0.671 (0.501)  
  Poor -0.338 (0.428)  -0.916 (0.363) * 0.467 (0.414)  0.809 (0.400) * 
  Good or very good -0.161 (0.567)  -0.556 (0.447)  0.357 (0.559)  0.437 (0.547)  
Mental health (base: moderate) Very poor -0.316 (0.694)  -0.703 (0.540)  1.673 (0.642) ** 0.764 (0.599)  
  Poor -0.522 (0.412)  -0.337 (0.341)  0.632 (0.396)  0.072 (0.376)  
  Good or very good -0.065 (0.556)  0.073 (0.430)  -0.116 (0.535)  -0.357 (0.528)  
Marital status (base: cohabiting) Married 0.400 (0.421)  1.517 (0.370) *** -0.916 (0.409) * -0.575 (0.395)  
  Separated, divorced, 
bereaved 
-0.001 (0.634)  -0.561 (0.522)  0.515 (0.618)  0.314 (0.599)  
Age (base: middle-aged [35 to 
49]) 
Young (20 to 34) -0.744 (0.405) † -0.640 (0.318) * 0.800 (0.393) * 0.713 (0.372) † 
  Older (50 to 75) 0.403 (0.506)  0.834 (0.426) † -0.244 (0.494)  0.080 (0.475)  
  Third country 0.015 (0.437)  0.393 (0.345)  -0.307 (0.417)  -0.152 (0.403)  
Living in Seoul (base: living in other metropolitan cities) 0.124 (0.354)  -0.013 (0.299)  0.119 (0.350)  -0.090 (0.328)  
/cut1      -3.189 (0.600)        
/cut2      -0.956 (0.558)        
/cut3      1.455 (0.561)        
_Cons   1.168 (0.671) †    -1.884 (0.691) ** -1.453 (0.642) * 
Obs.    204   221   219   215  
Prob > Chi2 
 
 0.0139   0.0000   0.0006   0.1336  
R2    0.1251   0.1363   0.1506   0.0869  




Paper 3: Human Capital and Welfare Receipt  
Among North Korean Defectors in South Korea 
 
Abstract  
This study examines whether human capital accumulated in North Korea (NK) or South 
Korea (SK) is associated with increases in welfare receipt (full or partial receipt versus no 
receipt) among North Korean Defectors (NKDs) in SK by analyzing the 2016 National Survey 
on the Status of the Education on Employment and Gender Equality of NKDs, using multinomial 
logistic regressions. Human capital of NKDs is measured by the presence of three means for its 
formation: 1) (higher) education in NK or SK, 2) work experience in NK or SK, and 3) 
participation in the employment support programs of the North Korean Defector Settlement 
Support System (NKDSSS) in the SK. The employment support programs include 1) job training 
program, 2) license acquisition support, 3) higher education support, 4) job search counseling 
program, or 5) job fairs and job-related programs. This study finds that higher education in SK is 
associated with decreases in full receipt of welfare. This study also suggests that work 
experience in SK is associated with decreases in both partial receipt and full receipt (with a 
stronger association on the latter) and that job training program is associated with increases in 
partial receipt while license acquisition support is associated with decreases in partial receipt 
(versus no receipt, the omitted group). These findings imply that the NKDSSS needs to focus on 
accumulating the human capital of NKDS in SK, particularly through work experience in SK, in 






 Beginning in the mid-1990s, a severe food crisis in North Korea (NK) resulting from 
natural disasters and the limitations of the communist system led to a large-scale exodus of 
people from North Korea (NK) to South Korea (SK) and other neighboring countries (Kim et al., 
2009; Ko et al., 2004; Min, 2008). The number of North Korean Defectors (NKDs) living in SK 
was 33,850 as of September 2021 (Ministry of Unification [MOU], n.d.a), and the number of 
defectors is expected to continue growing. Most NKDs experienced severe poverty and human 
rights violations from the moment of their birth until the moment they sought refuge in SK. 
Indeed, according to the National Human Rights Commission of Korea (NHRCK, 2017), 62.67% 
of NKDs faced severe hunger and disease while in NK or transit countries, 21.7% were directly 
trafficked, and 9% of females experienced sexual assault. Desperate to survive such challenges, 
NKDs arrive in SK with little human capital such as education or physical and mental health 
(Kim et al., 2009, Ko et al., 2004, as cited in Um et al., 2015). For example, the higher education 
attainment rate of NKDs is less than half the national average.37  
To help NKDs who enter SK with little to no human capital survive in a capitalist 
society, the SK government established the North Korean Defector Settlement Support System 
(NKDSSS) in 1997 to provide settlement support to NKDs. However, many NKDs continue to 
receive welfare benefits from the National Basic Livelihood Security System (NBLSS), the 
national public assistance program, even after the end of their residence protection period (74.1% 
of NKDs in 2005, Korean Statistical Information Service [KOSIS], n.d., as cited in Park, 2011). 
The NKDSSS has been criticized for increasing the welfare dependency of NKDs by making 
 
37 SK is famous for placing a high priority on its competitive and demanding educational system. In the OECD Data 
from 2018, 49% of SK residents between the ages of 25 and 64 had received a tertiary education; SK was ranked the 
third most educated country. Also in the OECD Data, for the period between 2014 and 2018, 69.7% of SK residents 




them accustomed to living as welfare recipients during their first five years in SK. In 2005, the 
SK government responded by initiating various employment incentives conditioned on job 
preparation or employment, with increases in these Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs). The 
CCTs conditioned on job preparation (job training incentives and license acquisition incentives) 
were eventually repealed in November 2014 (MOU, 2010–2019). 
Low levels of human capital (low education, poor physical and mental health, drug 
addiction, and criminal records) have been linked to poverty outcomes (Loprest & Nichols, 
2011). Indeed, lack of human capital has frequently been identified as a determinant of poverty 
among the NKD population (Cho et al., 2016). In the literature, which has addressed the 
relationship between education, training, and work and economic adjustment in general (mostly 
in terms of employment-related outcomes and income level), studies have found no association 
with education in NK, mixed outcomes on the association with education in SK and work 
experience in NK, and no association with work experience in SK. Regarding employment 
support programs, previous studies found no association with job training programs or license 
acquisition support, mixed outcomes on the association with a combination of the two, mixed 
outcomes on the association with employment subsidies and employment encouragement 
incentives, and no association with job search support.  
Two studies used welfare receipt as a proxy for the economic adjustment of NKDs, and 
reported mixed outcomes on the association with education in NK (Yoon, 2007), no association 
with education in SK (Kim & Baek, 2011), mixed outcomes on the association with work 
experience involving mental labor in NK (Yoon, 2007), and mixed outcomes on the association 
with individual employment support programs (Kim & Baek, 2011), specifically: 1) positive 




and employment encouragement incentives; 2) no association with job training programs, license 
acquisition support, or job search support individually; and 3) a negative association with job 
training incentives (Kim & Baek, 2011). One major limitation of these two studies is that they 
ignored a key aspect of human capital, work experience. Jeong (2016) calculated the human 
capital of NKDs using their individual earned income data and found that work experience in SK 
was the sole determinant of the individual earned income.  
To build on and expand the existing literature, this study aims to answer the research 
question: How does human capital (captured by three means of its formation: (higher) education, 
work experience, and participation in employment support programs) associate with welfare 





Human capital describes the intangible assets of acquired abilities (knowledge, skills, 
and know-how) and personal attributes that increase individuals’ economic productivity (Goldin, 
2019). Converting acquired ability and personal attributes into measurable terms, the Office for 
National Statistics of United Kingdom (ONSUK, 2013) defines individual human capital as a 
sum of present income and expected future income, considering qualifications (education, 
training, and work-life)38 and breaks in work (such as for sickness, parenthood, or retirement).  
 uman capital has also been studied in the context of immigrants’ and refugees’ 
economic adjustment. Previous studies have revealed that socio-economic status (SES) in the 
home country determines the level of human capital transferred to the host country and the 
recovery speed of SES in the host country (Chiswick et al., 2003; Rooth et al., 2006).  
Given that human capital can increase economic productivity, economic productivity can 
be increased by investing in human capital, as Becker (1964) explained with an analogy to the 
production of physical capital. Applying this concept today, companies and governments 
increase the human capital of their employees and citizens by supporting their education and 
training to improve their economic productivity. Conditional cash transfers (CCTs) that require 
job training program participation, license acquisition, or higher education aim to help recipients 
accumulate such types of human capital, while conditional in-kind benefits such as job search 
counseling programs, job fairs, and job-related programs can help participants obtain the 




38 Three key independent variables in this study ([higher] education, human capital gained from participation in 




Human capital of NKDs accumulated in NK 
The NKDs arrive in SK with very little human capital. Few accumulated any human 
capital at all in NK, one of the poorest countries in the world. The nominal Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) of NK was 16,331 million USD (125 out of 213 countries) in 2020, and the GDP 
per capita of NK was 640 USD (202 out of 213 countries; United Nations Statistics Division 
[UNSD], n.d.). In a country where people are starving due to food shortages, higher education is 
a luxury. Indeed, in NK, only 10% of students who pass the college entrance exam go to 
university (Korea Institute for National Unification, 2019, as cited in the Peaceful Unification 
Advisory Council [PUAC], 2019). In contrast, SK has a college entrance rate of 69.6% and has 
had the highest rate among OECD countries for 10 years (Ministry of Education, 2019, as cited 
in PUAC, 2019). 
In terms of quality, human capital accumulated in NK has less value than human capital 
accumulated in SK. The nominal GDP of NK is only 1.0% of  K’s GD  (1,646,539 million 
USD, which falls into the top 10; UNSD, n.d.). NK’s GD  per capita is 2.0% of the GD  per 
capita of SK, (32,143 USD, 37 out of 213 countries; UNSD, n.d.). This imbalance results in 
differences in the industrial structures of NK and SK; see Appendix 3-1. Using the industry 
classifications by Clark (1940), NK is 11.65 times more reliant on the primary industry than SK, 
while NK’s tertiary industry is 0.54 times the size of  K’s. Therefore, human capital 
accumulated in NK may not be as useful in the SK job market. That is, even the lucky NKDs 
who received higher education in NK face barriers to entry into the SK job market, which is 
ranked second in the world on the Human Capital Index (HCI) developed by the World Bank to 




As mentioned, immigrants and refugees who had a high level of human capital and high 
SES in their home countries are expected to recover their SES in a host country more quickly 
(Chiswick et al., 2003; Rooth et al., 2006). For example, NKDs who were communist party 
officials or professional workers (technicians, doctors, etc.) may have the necessary skills or 
social capital to be able to access better job opportunities and adjust more quickly and smoothly 
in SK. Meanwhile, due to the special challenges of NKDs coming from a communist society to a 
capitalist one, the opposite of this principle may occur, with NKDs of lower SES adjusting better 
to working in SK. Previous studies have highlighted the prevalence of black-market jobs in NK 
and China, which are performed by NK women of low SES. In communist NK, there is no 
vocational freedom; all jobs are assigned by the government based on family background and 
gender. Working-class men are usually assigned to do paid public services (mostly military 
services), leading their working-class wives to work in the black market (which is closely 
connected to the Chinese market) to earn a livelihood for their families. The knowledge, skills, 
and know-how gained from such black-market labor are very helpful for getting jobs and 
working in SK, promoting the economic adjustment of working-class NKDs in SK (Kim et al., 
2013). 
 
Human capital of NKDs accumulated in transit countries 
NKDs arrive in SK via two escape routes: 1) entering SK directly from NK and 2) 
entering SK indirectly via a third country (usually China). Because entering SK directly (either 
by crossing the landmine-filled Demilitarized Zone on the Korean Peninsula or by sea or by air) 
is much more dangerous, most NKDs escape through China. If they succeed in entering China, 




since the Chinese government adheres to the principle of forced repatriation to NK. Thus, some 
NKDs even go through China to Southeast Asian countries to ask for help there.  
While in China or other neighboring countries, NKDs’ identities as fugitives can expose 
them to various human rights violations. If their escape is discovered by undercover Chinese or 
NK officials, they are repatriated to NK and tortured or executed. Their family members in NK 
will be punished as well (Jeon et al., 2005; Ko et al., 2004). This situation inevitably exposes 
NKDs to various human rights violations39 (Kim et al., 2009; Ko et al., 2004). This ongoing 
presence in environments where they are vulnerable to human rights abuses results in a lack of 
human capital among NKDs in terms of education40 and physical41 and mental health42 (Kim et 
al., 2009, Ko et al., 2004, as cited in Um et al., 2015). In particular, poor physical and mental 
health may limit their abilities or opportunities to seek additional human capital or adjust 




39 According to Kim (2012), the percentage of female NKDs who experienced sexual violence was 44.3%, and the 
rate at which they experienced rape, the most serious level of sexual assault, was 2.5 times higher than for SK 
women.  
40 Education levels of the NKDs are low because most were forced to focus on survival in NK or transit 
countries. Thus, they did not have the means nor the luxury to attain proper levels of education. Indeed, the college 
graduation rate of the NKDs is 15.2% (either in NK or SK, Korea Hana Foundation [KHF], 2020), lower than that of 
all residents of SK (25-64 year-olds in 2020, 50.7%, OECD, 2021a) and much lower than that of young residents of 
SK (25-34 year-olds in 2020, 69.8%, OECD, 2021b). 
41 Regarding the necessary means of supports system for a better life in SK, 17.3% of the NKDs answered ‘medical 
support’ (the second highest percentage among the answers), regarding the reason why working less than 36 hours 
per week, 18.0% answered ‘health’ (the second highest percentage among the answers), and regarding the activity 
status of economically inactive persons, 25.6% answered ‘mental or physical disorder (health problem)’ (the highest 
percentage among the answers, KHF, 2020).  
42 NKDs also suffer from mental illnesses. According to the 2017 National Survey on Human Rights Violation and 
Trauma of NKDs commissioned by the National Human Rights Commission and performed by the National 
Medical Center, among 300 respondents, 247 (82.33%) had open self-criticism, 188 (62.67%) had faced severe 
hunger and disease, 65 (21.7%) were directly trafficked, and 22 (9% of the women) were victims of sexual assault. 
In a checklist for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 168 (56%) exceeded the "attentiveness" level (over 33), 
while on a depression-related test, 57 (19%) were mildly depressed, 96 (32%) were moderately depressed, and 85 




Human capital of NKDs accumulated in SK 
Human capital and the NKDSSS  
To help NKDs who enter SK with little to no human capital to survive in a capitalist 
society, the SK government established the NKDSSS to provide settlement support. The policy 
trend related to the NKDSSS can be divided into four periods: 1) 1962–1978, 2) 1979–1992, 3) 
1993–1996, and 4) 1997–present (MOU, n.d.c). Currently, NKDs receive settlement support 
under the North Korean Refugees Protection and Settlement Support Act (NKRPSSA) 
established in 1997. Specifically, the SK government provides 1) temporary financial support, 2) 
employment support, 3) housing support, 4) social security support, 5) educational support, 6) 
counseling support, and 7) security support during the residence protection period, which is the 
first five years after NKDs are released from Hanawon, a temporary residential center that 
provides them emergency support in their first three months (Art. 5 of the NKRPSSA). SK 
provides a five-year grace period of sorts for NKDs, who came from an outdated communist 
country, to gain the human capital necessary to survive in SK, a modern capitalist country. 
However, because 70% of NKDs remain in the national welfare program after this grace period 
and the number of NKDs entering SK has continued to increase, there have been growing calls 
for reform of the NKDSSS.  
In response, the SK government has introduced various pro-work policy reforms, which 
changed the types, conditions, and benefit levels of settlement support (MOU, 2010–2019). In 
2005, CCTs conditioned on participation in employment or job preparation activities were 
introduced, and CCTs increased in proportion to unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) during the 
first pro-work reform era (2005 to 2014). Focusing on employment support programs, before the 




government subsidizes wages for employers who hire NKDs. In 2005, the government 
introduced various employment incentives conditioned on job preparation activities (job training 
incentives and license acquisition incentives) or employment retention (employment 
encouragement incentives). It was expected that NKDs would accumulate the human capital 
required to find a job while fulfilling the required conditions (i.e., job training program 
participation or license acquisition). It was thought that giving NKDs incentives to accumulate 
human capital would be more effective at encouraging them to get a job than just giving them 
cash. However, government reports43 revealed the ineffectiveness of these incentives, and in 
2014, the government abolished the two existing employment incentives (job training incentives 
and license acquisition incentives) and employment subsidies. The government then introduced 
new savings incentives conditioned on employment, with benefit levels determined by the 
amount of NKDs’ savings (Kim et al., 2016; Park & Kim, 2012; Park et al., 2011).  
 
Literature Review  
Only two studies (Yoon, 2007; Kim & Baek, 2011) have examined the association 
between human capital and welfare receipt among NKDs. Yoon (2007) examined the association 
between health and welfare receipt, while Kim and Baek (2011) evaluated the association 
between employment support programs and economic adjustment, measured in terms of 
employment and welfare receipt. In this section, I first introduce the association between human 
capital (which those two studies added as control variables) and welfare receipt. Next, I use the 
broad literature on economic adjustment in general as background to complement the small 
 
43 Kim and Baek (2010), a report from the Ministry of Unification (MOU); Choi et al. (2010), a report from the 
Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL); Park et al. (2011), Park and Kim (2012), a report from the Korea 




number of studies that use welfare receipt as a proxy for economic adjustment. Specific 
information about the literature, such as the sample sizes and methods of these studies, is offered 
in Table 3-1.  
 
Education and economic adjustment  
Education in NK and economic adjustment 
There is only one study that addressed the association between education in NK and 
welfare receipt among NKDs. Yoon (2007) used five models to examine the association of 
health with welfare receipt. The models are distinguished by the independent variables: Model 1 
included demographic characteristics (age, age squared, gender, and months of residency in SK) 
as independent variables; Model 2 included education in NK, work experience in NK (mental 
labor experience, physical labor experience, or lack of work experience [students, homemakers, 
etc.], and the standard of living in NK; Model 3 included subjective health awareness only; 
Model 4 included all variables mentioned above; Model 5 was the same as Model 4, except for 
the inclusion of the health status factor index in lieu of subjective health awareness. Out of the 
five models, three models (Models 2, 4, and 5) showed the association of education in NK 
(ordinal variable) with welfare receipt. Summarizing the findings related to education in NK in 
those models, Yoon reported mixed results: it showed no association in two models (Models 2 
and 4) but a positive association44 in one model (Model 5).  
Regarding the association of education in NK on economic adjustment in general, studies 
found no association on employment (Kim, 2007 [higher education]; Kim, 2011 [high school and 
more than technical school]; Jeong, 2016 [higher education]; Jung et al., 2013 [higher 
 




education]; Park & Kim, 2012 [high school]), employment retention (Kim, 2011 [high school 
and more than technical school]; Park & Kim, 2012 [high school and higher education]; Kim & 
Kim, 2016 [higher education]), individual earned income (Jeong, 2016 [higher education]), or 
household income (Kim & Kim, 2016 [higher education]). Only Park and Kim (2012) found a 
positive association of higher education in NK on employment.  
 
Education in SK and economic adjustment 
Regarding the association between education in SK and welfare receipt, Kim and Baek 
(2011, all education in SK including higher education]) found no association. 
Regarding the association between education in SK and economic adjustment in general, 
studies have found mixed outcomes. Regarding employment, most studies found no association 
(Kim, 2007; Jeong, 2016 [all education in SK including higher education]; Kim, 2011 [higher 
education]; Kim & Baek, 2011 [all education in SK including higher education]; Park & Kim, 
2012) while one study reported positive associations (Jung et al., 2013 [both in a female sample 
and a female under 45 sample]). Studies have suggested there is no association between 
education in SK and employment retention (Kim, 2011 [higher education], Park & Kim, 2012; 
Kim & Kim, 2016 [higher education]). Regarding part-time work among the employed, one 
study reported no association (Kim & Baek, 2011 [all education in SK including higher 
education]). Regarding work experience among the unemployed, one study found a positive 
association (Kim & Baek, 2011 [no education and higher education]). Regarding individual 
earned income, one study reported no association (Jeong, 2016 [all education in SK including 




suggested a positive association. Regarding household income, one study showed no association 
(Kim & Kim, 2016 [higher education]).  
 
Work experience and welfare receipt  
Work experience in NK and welfare receipt  
Regarding the association between work experience in NK and welfare receipt, Yoon 
(2007) reported mixed results: out of the three models, NK work experience involving mental 
labor was associated with decreases in welfare receipt in two models (Models 2 and 4) and no 
association in one model (Model 5). Yoon reported no association between work experience that 
involved physical labor and welfare receipt, and mixed outcomes for lack of work experience 
(being a student, homemaker, etc.), which was associated with decreases in welfare receipt in 
one model (Model 2) and had no association in two models (Models 4 and 5).  
In terms of the association between work experience in NK and economic adjustment in 
general, studies have found mixed outcomes. Regarding employment, some studies reported a 
positive association (Jeong, 2016 [(black) market economic experience]; Park & Kim, 2012 
[(black) market economic experience in all models, assigned public work + (black) market 
economic activity experience in two models out of four, and assigned public work in one model 
out of four]) while others reported no association (Kim, 2011 [worker/farmer, technical 
profession]; Jung et al. 2013 [professional work and (black) market economic experience]). 
Regarding employment retention, some studies suggested a positive association with work 
experience in NK (Park & Kim, 2012 [(black) market economic experience and assigned public 
work + (black) market economic experience]; Kim & Kim, 2016 [duration of informal activities 




profession]; Kim & Kim, 2016 [various informal activities: home production/farming/repair; 
selling; smuggling/other]). Regarding individual earned income, one study (Jeong, 2016) showed 
no association with (black) market economic experience, length of work history, being related to 
someone in a given occupation, or educational major in NK. Regarding household income, one 
study (Kim & Kim, 2016) showed mixed outcomes: a positive association with experience with 
certain types of informal activities (smuggling/other in two models out of four and home 
production/ farming/repair in two models out of four) and no association with the duration of 
informal activities (in years).  
 
Work experience in SK and welfare receipt   
No study to date has addressed the association between work experience in SK and 
welfare receipt. Regarding the association between work experience in SK and economic 
adjustment in general, studies have shown mixed outcomes: there appears to be no association 
with employment (Kim, 2011 [previous employment period]) or employment retention (Kim, 
2011 [previous employment period]; Park & Kim, 2012 [industry types or business size (10–29 
employees compared to over 100 employees)]), mixed outcomes on the association with 
household income (Kim & Kim, 2016 [no association with temporary jobs in model 3 that does 
not include the share of informal income and a positive association with temporary jobs in model 








Benefits from employment support programs and welfare receipt 
Reviewing the association between employment support programs and welfare receipt, 
Kim and Baek (2011) reported no association with job training program participation, license 
acquisition, or job search support. They even reported that job training incentives were 
associated with increases in welfare receipt, as mentioned previously. However, the study 
suggested that a combination of job-training program participation, license acquisition, and 
employment encouragement incentives was associated with decreases in welfare receipt.  
The association between employment support programs and economic adjustment, in 
general, is as follows. Regarding job training program participation, most of the previous 
literature found no association (Jeong, 2016; Kim, 2007; Kim, 2011; Kim & Baek, 2011; Park & 
Kim, 2012; Jung et al., 2013 [both in a female sample and a female over 45 sample]). Jung et al. 
(2013) even reported that job training program participation was associated with decreases in the 
employment of women under 45, and Kim and Baek (2011) showed that job training incentives 
apparently were associated with increases in welfare receipt. Regarding license acquisition 
incentives, most studies found no association (Jeong, 2016; Kim, 2007; Kim, 2011; Park & Kim, 
2012), with the exception of Kim and Baek (2011), which reported that it had a positive 
association. 
Concerning the combination of job training program participation and license acquisition, 
two studies had mixed outcomes. Jung et al. (2013) suggested the combination was associated 
with increases in employment among women under 45, but not in the full sample or in women 
over 45. Kim and Baek (2011) reported that the combination was associated with decreases in 




between the combination and employment, work experience among the unemployed, or 
individual earned income among the employed.  
Finally, regarding the association with other employment support programs, previous 
studies found mixed outcomes. Concerning employment subsidies, some studies reported that 
they were associated with increases in employment (Park & Kim, 2012; Lim & Kang, 2014 [in 
the long term, policy trend study]) but they had no association with employment retention (Park 
& Kim, 2012). As for employment encouragement incentives, some studies suggested they had a 
positive association with employment (Kim, 2011; Kim & Baek, 201145) while others suggested 
no association (Park & Kim, 2012; Lim & Kang, 2014 [policy trend study]). Two studies found a 
positive association between employment encouragement incentives and employment retention 
(Kim, 2011; Park & Kim, 2012). One study found no association with individual earned income 
among the employed (Kim & Baek, 2011), while two studies reported that employment 
encouragement incentives were associated with decreases in welfare receipt (Kim & Baek, 2011; 
Lim & Kang, 2014 [policy trend study]). As for job search support,46 one study reported no 
association (Kim & Baek, 2011).47 
 
Contribution of this study 
This paper makes the following three contributions to the existing literature. First, this 
study updates evidence about the association between human capital and welfare receipt among 
NKDs using more recent data. The previous literature used data that extended through 2009. 
 
45 Kim and Baek (2011) found no association with part-time jobs or work experience among the unemployed. 
46 Job search counseling programs, job fairs, and other job-related programs. 
47 Kim and Baek (2011) reported that job search support (registration with job placement) was related to increases in 




Given that data on NKDs are limited and often restricted from public use, this new addition of 
evidence that uses 2016 data is important and timely.  
Second, this study examines the association with human capital and long-term economic 
adjustment, measured in terms of welfare receipt. Studies about the association between human 
capital and the economic adjustment of immigrants have found a positive association in the long 
term even if the association is not obvious in the short term. Therefore, there is room for re-
evaluation of programs’ effectiveness in the long term.  
Finally, this study examines the association between work experience in SK and welfare 
receipt. Considering that work experience in SK has been identified as a sole determinant of the 
individual earned income by Jeong (2016), who calculated the human capital of NKDs using 
individual earned income data, it is worthwhile to evaluate its association with welfare receipt, a 




 The population of this study is the entire NKD population in SK, all of whom are or were 
recipients of the NKDSSS. This study analyzed data on a sample of 200 NKDs—62 men (31%) 
and 138 women (69%)—from the 2016 National Survey on the Status of the Education on 
Employment and Gender Equality of NKDs. This dataset was collected by the MOGEF, which 
used a snowball sampling method. During the data collection, only one person per household 
(the first to volunteer) was allowed to respond. The unit of analysis is the household. 
This 2016 data is well suited to this study in two ways. First, this data is rare in that 




Second, it has abundant variables that are relevant to this study: economic indicators, education, 
job experiences, and participation in employment support programs implemented as part of the 
pro-work policy reforms. The data is also particularly useful because it differentiates whether the 
respondent accumulated human capital in NK or SK, enabling examination of the different 
associations with human capital accumulated in the two respective countries.  
 
Measures 
The dependent variable, welfare receipt, is measured using three categories: 2 = full 
receipt, 1 = partial receipt, and 0 = no receipt based on respondents’ answers to a question about 
the source of their income. A respondent is considered to have a full receipt if welfare is their 
only source of income; partial receipt if their income comes from both welfare and part-time 
work; and no receipt if their income source is full-time work, income from their spouse, or 
income from their spouse and part-time work. I excluded eight cases in which participants 
responded “etc.” and 11 cases in which respondents did not answer. The independent variables 
reflecting the presence of three means for human capital formation is measured using three sets 
of variables, all coded as yes/no dummy variables: 1) (higher) education, 2) work experience, 
and 3) participation in the employment support programs:48 
Regarding education, the three dummy variables are as follows:  
1. Higher education in NK is coded 1 if respondents received higher education from a 
professional school or college in NK, and 0 otherwise. 
2. Any education in SK is coded 1 if respondents received any education in SK, and 0 
 
48 Questions related to work experience in SK (any job) and participation in employment support programs asked 
respondents to check only if they have participated; thus, those who did not provide a response for this question 





3. Higher education either in NK or SK is coded 1 if respondents received higher 
education from a professional school or college in NK or an undergraduate or 
graduate program in SK, and 0 otherwise50.  
Regarding work experience, a 3-category variable to measure work experience in NK 
and a dummy variable to measure work experience in SK are created as follows:  
1. Work experience in NK has three categories as follows: 1) office, professional, or 
sales worker 2) soldier, laborer, or farmer, and 3) no work, student, etc. The third 
group is used as a base:  
2. Work experience in SK is coded 1 if respondents have had any job in SK, and 0 
otherwise. 
Regarding the acquired ability gained through employment support programs, four 
dummy variables are created as follows:  
1. Any (participation in) employment support program is coded 1 if respondents 
participated in such a program: 1) job training program, 2) license acquisition 
support, 3) higher education support, 4) job search counseling program, or 5) job 
fairs and job-related program; and 0 otherwise. 
2. Any (participation in) employment support program providing cash from the 
NKDSSS is coded 1 if respondents participated in such a program: 1) job training 
program, 2) license acquisition support, or 3) higher education support; 0 otherwise. 
3. Job training program (participation) is coded 1 if respondents participated in job 
 
49 I do not measure higher education in SK because the number of people who received higher education in SK is 
small (N=28). 
50 Considering the small sample size of higher education in SK (N=28), I combined higher education in NK (N= 




training programs; 0 otherwise.  
4. License acquisition support is coded 1 if respondents received support to acquire a 
license; 0 otherwise. 
Based on the existing literature, I include other demographic characteristics such as 
gender (female), age (young [20 to 29]; middle-aged [30 to 49]; and older [50 or over]), marital 
status (married or cohabiting; unmarried; or separated, divorced, or bereaved), children in the 
household (participant lives with at least one child), years of residency in SK, residence 
protection period (whether a respondent is within the residence protection period [their first 
five years in SK]), and residence location (Seoul). The base of the dummy variable Seoul is 
located in the metropolitan areas near Seoul (in Incheon or Gyeonggi-do).  
 
Data analysis  
The data analysis consisted of two steps. First, descriptive analysis is conducted to 
analyze the characteristics of the sample related to welfare receipt, human capital, and 
demographics. Second, because the dependent variable is a three-category variable, multinomial 
logistic regression is performed to detect the association between the key independent variables 
and different levels of welfare receipt (full or partial receipt versus no receipt).  
Six different regression models (models A1–A3 and B1–B3) are run to detect the 
differences in the associations with participation in employment support programs. These models 
are divided into two based on different measures of education: 1) the A models include two 
variables—higher education in NK and any education in SK; and 2) the B models include one 




Through the different measures of participation in employment support programs, these 
models are divided into three: 1) Model 1 uses participation in any employment support 
programs (job training program, license acquisition support, higher education support, job search 
counseling program, or job fairs and job-related program); 2) Model 2 uses participation in any 
employment support programs that provide cash (job training program, license acquisition 
support, or higher education support). Model 3 includes job training programs and license 




Results from the descriptive analysis are presented in Table 3-2. The analysis shows that 
the welfare receipt rates among NKDs are as follows: full receipt (25.4%), partial receipt 
(24.3%), and no receipt (50.3%). It also shows that only 23.2% of the NKDs received higher 
education in NK, while 30.4% received some education in SK.51 32.6% of the NKDs received 
any higher education in either NK or SK. Regarding work experience in NK, 25.7% of the NKDs 
had been office, professional, or sales workers; 46.9% had been soldiers, laborers, or farmers; 
and 27.4% had no work experience or had been students, etc.52 
With regard to the employment support programs provided by the SK government, 57.8% 
of the NKDs had participated in an employment support program of any kind; 52.2% had 
 
51 Only 23.2% of the NKDs received higher education in NK; 13.8% received education in SK; and 32.6% received 
higher education either in NK or SK (Appendix 3-2). Due to the small sample size for higher education in SK 
(N=25), this study uses higher education received in NK and any education received in SK to measure education. 
52 Work experiences in NK can be divided into four categories as follows: soldier, laborer, or farmer (46.4%); no 
work, student, etc. (27.1%); office or professional work (14.4%); and sales (11.0%). Given the small sample size of 
those variables, I combined the last two, which have been found to be associated with the economic adjustment of 




participated in an employment support program that provided cash; 26% had participated in job 
training programs; 26.5% had received license acquisition support.53  
Regarding the demographic characteristics, 69.1% of the respondents are female. In terms 
of age group, most are aged 30 to 49 (59.3%), the next largest age group is older (50 to 74, 
23.4%), followed by younger (20 to 29, 17.4%). As for marital status, 44.8% of the NKDs are 
married or cohabiting; 30.9% are unmarried; 24.3% are separated, divorced, or bereaved. About 
half of the NKDs (45.3%) have at least one child in the household. The average respondent has 
been living in SK for 7.6 years; with 22.1% of respondents still within the residence protection 
period.54 Finally, 46.2% of the respondents are living in Seoul, while 53.8% live in Incheon or 
Gyeonggi-do, metropolitan areas near Seoul. 
 
Human capital and welfare receipt55  
Human capital and welfare receipt in model A  
Table 3-3 shows the result from the multinomial regression analysis conducted to test 
the association between human capital and the welfare receipt of NKDs with a model A group. 
To summarize, among human capital, work experience in SK is associated with decreases in 
both partial receipt and full receipt; the association is larger for reducing the odds of full receipt. 
Job training program participation is associated with increases only in partial receipt, while in 
contrast, license acquisition support is associated with decreases in partial receipt (versus no 
receipt, the omitted group). Among the demographic characteristics, being female, being 
 
53 Percentages of individuals who participated in employment support programs are as follows: job training 
programs (26.0%), license acquisition support (26.5%), higher education support (11.0%), job counseling (7.2%), 
and job fairs (3.3%; Appendix 3-2). 
54 Most NKDs (75.1%) entered SK after the 2005 pro-work reform of the NKDSSS (Appendix 3-2).  





unmarried, being separated, divorced, or bereaved is associated with increases in full receipt 
only; being old (50 to 74) is associated with increases in partial receipt only; years of residency 
in SK are associated with decreases in partial receipt only. 
Next, I review the outcomes related to human capital. For any work experience in SK, in 
model A1 the regression coefficient for partial receipt is -1.390 (p<0.05, Column (1)) and it is -
2.966 for full receipt (p<0.001, Column (4)), thus any work experience in SK has a much larger 
association in reducing the odds of full receipt than in reducing partial receipt. Regarding job 
training programs, the regression coefficient for partial receipt in model A3 is 1.199 (p<0.1, 
Column (3)) while it is 0.938 for full receipt (nonsignificant, Column (6)), thus job training 
program participation is associated with increases in the odds of partial receipt only. Concerning 
license acquisition support, in model A3 the regression coefficient for partial receipt is -3.086 
(p<0.001, Column (3)) while it is -0.763 for full receipt (nonsignificant, Column (6)), thus 
license acquisition support appears to be associated with decreases in the odds of partial receipt 
only. The same trend appears in models A2 and A3 for all of these outcomes. 
Among the demographic characteristics, being female, being unmarried, and being 
separated, divorced, or bereaved is associated with increases in full receipt only; being older (50 
to 74) is associated with increases in partial receipt only; years of residency in SK is associated 
with decreases in partial receipt only. Specifically, in terms of females, in model A1 the 
regression coefficient for partial receipt is 0.269 (nonsignificant, Column (1)) while it is -1.336 
for full receipt (p<0.1, Column (4)), thus being a woman appears to be associated with 
decreases in the odds of full receipt only. Regarding older age (50 to 74), in model A1 the 
regression coefficient for partial receipt is 1.269 (p<0.1, Column (1)) while it is 0.986 for full 




the odds of partial receipt only. Concerning being unmarried, in model A1 the regression 
coefficient for partial receipt is 0.928 (nonsignificant, Column (1)) while it is 3.009 for full 
receipt (p<0.01, Column (4)), thus being unmarried appears to be associated with increases in 
the odds of full receipt only. As for being separated, divorced, or bereaved, in model A1 the 
regression coefficient for partial receipt is -0.395 (nonsignificant, Column (1)) while it is 2.448 
for full receipt (p<0.01, Column (4)), thus being separated, divorced, or bereaved appears to be 
associated with increases in the odds of full receipt only. Concerning the years of residency in 
SK, in model A1 the regression coefficient for partial receipt is -0.212 (p<0.05, Column (1)) 
while it is 0.128 for full receipt (nonsignificant, Column (4)), thus a longer period of residency 
in SK appears to be associated with increases in the odds of partial receipt only. As for living in 
Seoul, in model A1 the regression coefficient for partial receipt is 1.103 (p<0.1, Column (1)) 
while it is 1.480 for full receipt (p<0.05, Column (4)), thus living in Seoul is associated with 
increases in the odds of partial receipt and full receipt to a similar extent. Finally, for all of these 
control variables, the same trend appears in models A2 and A3.  
 
Human capital and welfare receipt in model B  
Table 3-4 shows the results of the multinomial regression analysis conducted to test the 
association between human capital and welfare receipt among NKDs in model B. To summarize 
these results, higher education either in NK or SK is associated with decreases in full receipt 
only; work experience in SK is associated with decreases in both partial receipt and full receipt 
with a larger association on the latter; job training program is associated with increases in partial 
receipt only; and in contrast, license acquisition support is associated with decreases in partial 




or bereaved is associated with increases in full receipt only. Having at least one child in the 
household and having lived in SK longer are associated with decreases in partial receipt only 
while living in Seoul is associated with increases in both partial receipt and full receipt. 
Next, I review the outcomes related to human capital. For higher education either in NK 
or SK, in model B1 the regression coefficient for partial receipt is 0.378 (nonsignificant, Column 
(1)) while it is -2.789 for full receipt (p<0.01, Column (4)), thus higher education either in NK or 
SK appears to be associated with increases in the odds of full receipt only. For any work 
experience in SK, in model B1 the regression coefficient for partial receipt is -1.389 (p<0.05, 
Column (1)) while it is -3.521 for full receipt (p<0.001, Column (4)), thus any work experience 
in SK has a much larger association at reducing full receipt than reducing partial receipt; the 
same trend appears in model B2 and B3. Regarding job training programs, in model B3 the 
regression coefficient for partial receipt is 1.148 (p<0.1, Column (3)) while it is 1.117 for full 
receipt (not significant, Column (6)), thus job training programs appears to be associated with 
increases in the odds of partial receipt only. 
As for the license acquisition support, in model B3 the regression coefficient for partial 
receipt is -3.155 (p<0.001, Column (3)) while it is -0.782 for full receipt (not significant, Column 
(6)), thus license acquisition support appears to be associated with increases in the odds of partial 
receipt only. 
Next, I outline the outcomes related to demographic characteristics. In terms of being 
unmarried, in model B1 the regression coefficient for partial receipt is 1.120 (nonsignificant, 
Column (1)) while it is 3.394 for full receipt (p<0.01, Column (4)), thus being unmarried appears 
to be associated with increases in the odds of full receipt only. As for being separated, divorced, 




Column (1)) while it is 2.579 for full receipt (p<0.01, Column (4)), thus being separated, 
divorced, or bereaved appears to be associated with increases in the odds of full receipt only. 
Concerning having a child in the household, in model B1 the regression coefficient for partial 
receipt is -0.927 (p<0.1, Column (1)) while it is 0.128 for full receipt (nonsignificant, Column 
(4)), thus having at least one child in the household appears to be associated with increases in the 
odds of partial receipt only. Regarding the years of residency in SK, in model B1 the regression 
coefficient for partial receipt is -0.236 (p<0.05, Column (1)) while it is 0.162 for full receipt 
(nonsignificant, Column (4)), thus having lived in SK longer appears to be associated with 
increases in the odds of partial receipt only. As for living in Seoul, in model B1 the regression 
coefficient for partial receipt is 1.387 (p<0.05, Column (1)) while it is 1.410 for full receipt 
(p<0.05, Column (4)), thus living in Seoul is associated with increases in the odds of partial and 
full receipt to similar extents. Finally, for all of these control variables, the same trend appears in 
models B2 and B3.  
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
This study examines the association between human capital (education, work experience 
in NK or SK, and employment support programs) and welfare receipt among NKDs by analyzing 
data from the 2016 National Survey on the Status of the Education on Employment and Gender 
Equality of NKDs, using multinomial logistic regression analysis. To summarize the findings, 
higher education either in NK or SK is associated with decreases in only full welfare receipt. 
(This seems to come from the association with higher education in SK, considering that higher 
education in NK is not associated with decreases in full receipt in model A.) Work experience in 




on the latter. Job training program participation is associated with increases in partial receipt 
only, while in contrast, license acquisition support is associated with decreases in partial receipt.  
These findings are similar to those from the previous literature except for two variables:  
higher education in SK and license acquisition support. First, in reviewing the association 
between education and welfare receipt, the lack of association between higher education in NK 
and welfare receipt is similar to Yoon’s (2007) finding of mixed results (no or positive56 
association). The lack of association of any education in SK with welfare receipt is similar to the 
results of Kim and Baek (2011), which suggested no association. However, the negative 
association of higher education in SK with welfare receipt differs from Kim and Baek (2011), 
which reported no association. The different finding on higher education in SK is probably due 
to different measures for welfare receipt or survey period. Specifically, I run the multinomial 
logistic regression, measuring welfare receipt with a three-category dependent variable 
(full/partial/no receipt) while Kim and Baek (2011) used logistic regression, measuring welfare 
receipt with a dummy variable (receipt/no receipt). Also, the data used in this study was 
collected in 2016 when the second wave of pro-work reform (2015−present) was in progress; the 
data used in Kim and Baek (2011) was collected in 2010 when the first wave of pro-work reform 
(2005−2014) was in progress.57 Lastly, the welfare receipt rate in 2010 was 51.3% (Report from 
the MOU, as cited in Ha, 2016) while that in 2016 was 24.4% (Report from the MOU, as cited in 
Kim, 2019). However, if the scope of the previous literature review is expanded to economic 
outcomes in general, the findings are similar to the previous studies showing mixed results (no or 
 
56 The determination of either positive or negative direction is based on the inclination between the dependent and 
independent variables.   
57 Through the first wave of pro-work reforms (2005−2014), the targeted population of the NKD    has narrowed 
down from all to job seekers or employed; through the second wave of pro-work reforms (2015− resent), it was 




positive associations), in that higher education levels in SK are associated with increases in 
economic adjustment measures.  
Next, in reviewing the association between welfare receipt and work experience, the lack 
of association of work experience in NK with welfare receipt is similar to Yoon’s (2007) finding 
of mixed results (no or negative association). Regarding the negative association of work 
experience in SK with welfare receipt, no previous study has addressed this. If the study is 
expanded to include economic outcomes in general, the findings are similar to previous studies 
that had mixed results (no or positive associations), in that here work experience in SK is 
associated with increases in economic adjustment. Lastly, in reviewing the association between 
employment support programs and welfare receipt, the positive association of job training 
program participation with welfare receipt is similar to findings by Kim and Baek (2011) that 
suggested mixed results (no or positive association). The negative association of license 
acquisition support differs from Kim and Baek (2011) who found no association. The different 
outcome for license acquisition support is probably due to the different measures for welfare 
receipt or survey period. Specifically, unlike this study, Yoon (2007) used logistic regression, 
measuring welfare receipt with a dummy variable (receipt/no receipt). Also, the data used in this 
study was collected in 2016 when the second wave of pro-work reform (2015− resent) was in 
progress while Yoon (2007) was collected in 2005 when the first wave of pro-work reform 
(2005−2014) started.  astly, the welfare receipt rate in 2005 was 74.1% (KOSIS, n.d.a, as cited 
in Park, 2011) while that in 2016 was 24.4% (Report from the MOU, as cited in Kim, 2019). 
However, if expanding studies on economic outcomes in general, it is similar to the previous 
studies which showed mixed results (no or positive associations) in that license acquisition 




Additionally, among the demographic characteristics in all of the models, being female, 
being unmarried, or being separated, divorced, or bereaved is associated with increases in full 
receipt only; in model A, being older is associated with increases in partial receipt; having lived 
in SK longer and (in model B only) having at least one child in the household is associated with 
decreases in partial receipt; living in Seoul is associated with increases in both partial receipt and 
full receipt to similar extents.  
 The findings of this study suggest several policy implications. First, we cannot expect that 
human capital accumulated in NK is associated with increases in the economic adjustment of 
NKDs in SK; instead, we must focus on human capital accumulated in SK. Work experience in 
NK may not help NKDs find jobs and discontinue welfare participation for two reasons. One 
reason is that according to Toffler's (1980) classification, NK is an agrarian society while SK is a 
post-industrial society, thus there are huge gaps in the skills required by the two respective labor 
markets. We can deduce that the rudimentary work experience NKDs had in their home country 
does not meet the demands of modern work in SK. The second reason is that NK is a communist 
society while SK is a capitalist society. Skills and know-how gained from communist society 
have limited value as human capital in a capitalist society.  n addition, NKDs’ jobs in NK are 
most likely assigned based on class and gender, rather than vocational aptitude. For the same 
reasons, (higher) education in NK may not aid in the economic adjustment of NKDs in SK. 
Therefore, it is more efficient to focus on helping NKDs accumulate human capital in SK and 
guiding them toward career paths based on their individual aptitudes and the industrial demands 
of work in SK.  
 The second policy implication is that the NKDSSS should help NKDs enter the job 




rather than aimlessly meandering through job training programs. The results of this study show 
that work experience in SK is the major factor that reduces full welfare receipt in SK, while 
employment support programs as a whole do not associate with welfare receipt. Learning the 
necessary job skills in the market seems to be more effective than learning those skills in 
government-run programs. Therefore, the pro-work policy reforms initiated in 2015, which 
tended to link CCTs to employment conditions alone, seem to be moving in the right direction. 
Third, conditions related to job preparation should be set such that recipients do not lose 
their benefits when they gain full-time employment. This study suggests that job training 
program participation is associated with increases in partial receipt while license acquisition 
support is associated with decreases in it. These findings indicate that policymakers should be 
careful when creating conditions related to job preparation. The key difference between the two 
conditions is that if recipients find a full-time job, they lose out on CCTs based on job training 
incentives but can keep CCTs based on license acquisition incentives. Thus, job training 
incentives may actually incentivize recipients to avoid getting full-time jobs. Findings related to 
job training programs support this concern; it is likely that some NKDs would choose not to have 
a full-time job in order to maintain their job training incentives,58 and this could create long-
lasting side effects. Therefore, when using job preparation activities as conditions, politicians 
should be careful not to incentivize recipients to remain job seekers, either officially or 
unofficially. That is, the conditions related to job preparation should be set such that recipients 
do not lose their benefits when they gain full-time employment. Thus, it is unfortunate that not 
 
58 Some NKDs might choose to have part-time jobs, which they do not need to report, and receive both a salary and 
job training incentives. In the short term (during the period that NKDs can receive job training incentives), this 
would be a wise decision, because the total income might be higher than any wage NKDs could receive from a full-
time job. However, in the long term, the delay in entering the job market might result in delayed career 
development. This delay would be rewarded only if the skills accumulated through participation in the job training 




all of the CCTs conditioned on job preparation were abolished in the recent reforms. Unlike job 
training programs, license acquisition support is found to have positive associations on economic 
adjustment, as suggested by several previous studies, and license acquisition support is found to 
be associated with decreases in partial welfare receipt only. Full discontinuation of welfare is 
possible only for recipients who are unemployed but able to work, rather than those who are 
unemployed and unable to work. The proportion of those who are unemployed but able to work 
is higher among full welfare recipients, except for new arrivals. That may explain why only 
license acquisition support is associated with decreases in partial welfare receipt. 
Meanwhile, welfare participation can also affect human capital formation (Han & Gao, 
2020). However, in this case, it is difficult for welfare participation to occur before higher 
education in NK/SK, work experiences in NK/SK, and employment support program 
participation in SK in general. It is because the welfare receipt rate was examined at the time of 
the survey, in 2016, and most of the NKD respondents of this survey received settlement support 
programs for the first five years prior to the survey. Among the recent arrivals whose period of 
residency is within a year, human capital formation in SK might occur simultaneously with 
welfare participation, considering that social security support is provided for the first year. In this 
case, there is a possibility that welfare participation is associated with work experience and 
employment support program participation in SK. However, this case represents a small portion 
of the respondents (N=8, 4.5%); thus, I assume there is a remote possibility that its influence is 
significant.  
This study has several limitations related to the data. First, this study is limited by the 
variety of variables. As mentioned earlier, individual human capital can be measured as the sum 




training, and work-life) and breaks in work (due to sickness, parenthood, or retirement; ONSUK, 
n.d.). This study focuses on three factors related to qualifications. It would be possible to 
examine the association with human capital more comprehensively by including factors related 
to work continuity, but the 2016 data did not offer any relevant variables.  
This study could be improved if a larger sample size was available. A larger sample size 
would potentially enable me to include a variable on higher education in SK and examine its 
association directly. I could also differentiate a variable, work experiences in NK (office, 
professional, or sales worker) into two separate variables, one for office or professional work and 
another for sales, as in Appendix 3-3. I could also analyze the associations while limiting the 
samples by gender or age groups or using interaction terms.  
Finally, this study is limited by the snowball sampling method of the data collection, 
which almost all studies of NKDs share. As a result, the sample does not represent the whole 
population, and bias cannot be measured, which decreases the generalizability of this study’s 
findings (Bornstein et al., 2017). Hopefully, national panel data on NKDs collected using 






Table 3-1: Information on previous literature 
Article Proxies of economic adjustment Data (Sample size) Methods 
Yoon 
(2007) 
-Welfare receipt - 2005 survey on the settlement of North Korean migrants of the 
Information Center for North Korean Human Rights (N=1,210) 
- Logistic regression 
Kim 
(2007) 
- Employment - 2003 survey of the Korea Research Institute for Vocational 
Education and Training (KRIVET) (N=200) 
- Chi-square test 





- Duration of work 
- Duration of unemployment period 
- Merged data which combined data from the HRD-net, a database 
of the MOEL, a database of employment insurance, and data from 
the NKD support groups (N=3650) 
- Logistic regression 




- Employment  
- Welfare receipt 
- 2009 NKDs Economic Activity Survey of the KRIVET (N=559) - Logistic/linear regression 
Kim 
(2011) 
- Employment offering four major 
insurances (Health insurance, national 
pension, employment insurance, workers' 
compensation)  
- Employment retention period during the 
last five years. 
- Merged data which combines the Ministry of Unification (MOU) 
data (2005 enterers) with an employment insurance database of the 
Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL) for quantitative 
analysis (N=1214) 
- Self-surveyed data with the interview for qualitative analysis 
(N=20) 
Mixed methods:  
- Logistic/ 
multiple linear regression 
for quantitative analysis  





- Employment  
- Duration of work 
- Merged data from the survey conducted by the 2010 Ewha 
Institute of Unification Studies (EIUS) with the DB of employment 
subsidies and employment encouragement subsidies provided by 
the MOU (N=413) 
 
- Logistic regression 
- Cox hazard analysis 
Jung et al. 
(2013) 




- Job training program participation 
- License acquisition 
Satisfaction level of those two programs 
- Employment 
- Income 
- Job security 
- Welfare receipt  
- 2005−2012 Economic activity trends of NKDs from the Database 
Center for North Korean Human Rights (NKDB) 
- Policy trend analysis 
Cho et al. 
(2016) 
 - 2016 Survey on Education Status of Employment and Gender 
Equality of NKDs (N=200)  




- Individual income 
- 2016  urvey on NKD’  daptation to Korean  ociety” of the 
Korea Development Institute (N=325) 





- Job stability   
- Household income 
- 2015 Self-surveyed data (N=485) - Logistic regression   
- Ordinary 





Table 3-2: Descriptive statistics of sample characteristics  
 No receipt Part receipt Full receipt Total χ2 
N % N % N % N % 
Welfare receipt   91        (50.3) 44        (24.3) 46        (25.4) 181 (100.0)  
Education Higher education 
in NK 
Yes 28 (30.8) 11 (25.0) 3 (6.5) 42 (23.2) 10.1862** 
Noa  63 (69.2) 33 (75.0) 43 (93.5) 139 (76.8) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Any education in 
SK  
Yes 21 (23.1) 18 (40.9) 16 (34.8) 55 (30.4) 5.0219+ 
Noa  70 (76.9) 26 (59.1) 30 (65.2) 126 (69.6) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Higher education 
either in NK or 
SK 
Yes 33 (36.3) 18 (40.9) 8 (17.4) 59 (32.6) 6.7813* 
No 58 (63.7) 26 (59.1) 38 (82.6) 122 (67.4) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Work experience Work experience 
in NK  
 
office, professional, or sales 
worker 
29 (31.9) 11 (25.0) 6 (13.6) 46 (25.7) 8.2229+ 
Soldier, laborer, or farmer 43 (47.3) 21 (47.7) 20 (45.5) 84 (46.9) 
 No work, student, or etc. 19 (20.9) 12 (27.3) 18 (40.9) 49 (27.4) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 179 (100.0) 
 Work experience 
in SK 
Yes 83 (91.2) 31 (70.5) 22 (47.8) 136 (75.1) 31.4661 
*** 
No 8 (8.8) 13 (29.5) 24 (52.2) 45 (24.9) 





Yes 52 (57.8) 22 (50.0) 30 (65.2) 104 (57.8) 2.1347 
No a 38 (42.2) 22 (50.0) 16 (34.8) 76 (42.2) 




Yes 47 (52.2) 20 (45.5) 27 (58.7) 94 (52.2) 1.5803 
No a 43 (47.8) 24 (54.5) 19 (41.3) 86 (47.8) 
Total 90 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 180 (100.0) 
Job training 
program 
Yes 20 (22.0) 14 (31.8) 13 (28.3) 47 (26.0) 1.6627 
No a 71 (78.0) 30 (68.2) 33 (71.7) 134 (74.0) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 








No 58 (63.7) 40 (90.9) 35 (76.1) 133 (73.5) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Demographic 
characteristics 
Female  Yes 63 (69.2) 27 (61.4) 35 (76.1) 125 (69.1) 2.2841 
No 28 (30.8) 17 (38.6) 11 (23.9) 56 (30.9) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Age Young (20 to 29) 7 (7.7) 9 (20.5) 13 (28.3) 29 (16.0) 18.5586** 
Middle-aged (30 to 49) 57 (62.6) 23 (52.3) 19 (41.3) 99 (54.7) 
Older (50 to 74) 16 (17.6) 12 (27.3) 11 (23.9) 39 (21.5) 
Missing 11 (12.1) 0 (0.0) 3 (6.5) 14 (7.7) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (107.0) 181 (108.4) 
Partner status Married or cohabiting 58 (63.7) 17 (38.6) 6 (13.0) 81 (44.8) 34.5432*** 
Unmarried 16 (17.6) 18 (40.9) 22 (47.8) 56 (30.9) 
Separated, divorced, or 
bereaved 
17 (18.7) 9 (20.5) 18 (39.1) 44 (24.3) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
At least one child 
living in the 
household  
Yes 54 (59.3) 11 (25.0) 17 (37.0) 82 (45.3) 15.8494*** 
No 37 (40.7) 33 (75.0) 29 (63.0) 99 (54.7) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Years of 
residency in SK 
(cont.)d 
Total 79 8.7 years 
[3.826] 
40 6.7 years 
[3.752] 
45 6.7 years 
[3.966] 




protection period  
Yes 11 (12.1) 11 (25.0) 18 (39.1) 40 (22.1) 13.2634** 
No 80 (87.9) 33 (75.0) 28 (60.9) 141 (77.9) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Resides in Seoul  Yes 49 (53.8) 19 (43.2) 16 (34.8) 84 (46.4) 5.3332 
No 30 (33.0) 20 (45.5) 22 (47.8) 72 (39.8) 
Missing 12 (13.2) 5 (11.4) 8 (17.4) 25 (13.8) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Notes: a There is no option for no; N/A is counted as no. b 1) job training program, 2) license acquisition support, 3) higher education support, 4) job search 
counseling program, or 5) job fairs and job-related program. c 1) job training program, 2) license acquisition support, or 3) higher education support. d Summary 






Table 3-3: Multinomial logistic regression results on the association between human capital and welfare receipt (Model A group)  
Partial receipt Full receipt 
 Model A1 Model A2 Model A3 Model A1 Model A2 Model A3  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Education 
                  



























                  
− in NK (soldier, 













− in NK (office, 














− in  K (any job) -1.390 (0.671) * -1.399 (0.671) * -1.407 (0.766) † -2.966 (0.711) *** -2.964 (0.711) *** -3.149 (0.763) *** 
Employment support 
programs 




       
0.006 (0.581) 




   
-0.738 (0.546) 
       
-0.043 (0.565) 
    
Job training program  
      
1.199 (0.661) † 





      
-3.086 (0.859) *** 





                  






1.336 (0.684) † 1.354 (0.686) * 1.615 (0.724) * 
Age (Base: Middle-
aged [30 to 49]) 
                  




















Marital status (Base: 
Married or 
cohabiting) 
                  






3.009 (0.927) ** 3.045 (0.920) ** 3.566 (0.980) *** 
 - Separated, 












Having at least one 
child living in the 
household (Base: 












Years of residency in 
SK 






Within a residence 
protection period 















Living in Seoul 
(Base: Incheon, 
Gyeonggi-do) 
1.103 (0.580) † 1.176 (0.593) * 1.517 (0.686) * 1.480 (0.626) * 1.471 (0.626) * 1.487 (0.642) * 








































Notes: a β (regression coefficients) are presented. b 1) job training program, 2) license acquisition support, 3) higher education support, 4) job search counselling 
program, or 5) job fairs and job-related program. c 1) job training program, 2) license acquisition support, or 3) higher education support. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, 








Table 3-4: Multinomial logistic regression results on the association between human capital and welfare receipt (Model B group)  
Partial receipt Full receipt  
Model B1 Model B2 Model B3 Model B1 Model B2 Model B3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Education 
                  
Higher education either 







-2.789 0.924 ** -2.706 0.909 ** -2.783 0.947 ** 
Work experience 
                  














− in NK (office, 














− in  K (any job) -1.389 0.703 * -1.417 0.700 * -1.201 0.794 
 
-3.521 0.781 *** -3.497 0.775 *** -3.563 0.812 *** 
Employment support 
programs 




       
0.242 0.618 




   
-0.696 0.543 
       
0.141 0.583 
    
Job training program  
      
1.148 0.654 † 





      
-3.155 0.862 *** 





                  










1.473 0.750 † 
Age (Base: Middle-aged 
[30 to 49]) 
                  
























Marital status (Base: 
Married or cohabiting) 
                  




1.419 0.806 † 3.394 0.977 ** 3.443 0.973 *** 4.003 1.029 *** 













Having at least one child 
living in the household 
(Base: Having no 
children in the 
household) 






Years of residency in SK -0.236 0.106 * -0.231 0.105 * -0.266 0.122 * 0.162 0.122  0.154 0.121  0.186 0.124  
Within a residence 
protection period (Base: 














Living in Seoul (Base: 
Incheon, Gyeonggi-do) 
1.387 0.604 * 1.437 0.619 * 1.936 0.719 ** 1.410 0.642 * 1.347 0.637 * 1.445 0.655 * 








































Notes: a β (regression coefficients) are presented. b 1) job training program, 2) license acquisition support, 3) higher education support, 4) job search counselling 
program, or 5) job fairs and job-related program. c 1) job training program, 2) license acquisition support, or 3) higher education support. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, 





Appendix 3-1: Comparison of major industries between NK and SK 
Industry  NK SK NK or SK 
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing  23.3 2.0 11.65 
Primary industry in total   23.3 2.0 11.65 
Mine  10.6 0.1 106.00 
Manufacturing  18.8 29.2 0.64 
Electric water supply business  5.4 2.1 2.57 
Construction  8.9 5.9 1.51 
Second industry in total  43.7 37.3 1.17 
Service  33.0 60.7 0.54 
Tertiary industry in total  33.0 60.7 0.54 
Notes: In presenting this table, I summarized information compiled and extrapolated from the PUAC blog (PUAC, 2020) of which original sources are Bank of 







Appendix 3-2: Descriptive statistics of sample characteristics  
 No receipt Part receipt Full receipt Total χ2 
N % N % N % N % 
Welfare receipt   91        (50.3) 44        (24.3) 46        (25.4) 181 (100.0)  
Education in NK Education in NK 4-year college 14 (15.4) 2 (4.5) 0 (0.0) 16 (8.8) 25.5418** 
2-year college 14 (15.4) 9 (20.5) 3 (6.5) 26 (14.4) 
Junior-high 52 (57.1) 19 (43.2) 34 (73.9) 105 (58.0) 
Elementary 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (2.2) 1 (0.6) 
Noa 11 (12.1) 14 (31.8) 8 (17.4) 33 (18.2) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Any education in 
NK  
Yes 80 (87.9) 30 (68.2) 38 (82.6) 148 (81.8) 7.774* 
Noa 11 (12.1) 14 (31.8) 8 (17.4) 33 (18.2) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Higher education 
in NK 
Yes 28 (30.8) 11 (25.0) 3 (6.5) 42 (23.2) 10.1862** 
Noa 63 (69.2) 33 (75.0) 43 (93.5) 139 (76.8) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Education in SK Any education in 
SK 
Grads 2 (2.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (1.1) 10.0623 
Undergrads 10 (11.0) 7 (15.9) 6 (13.0) 23 (12.7) 
High 7 (7.7) 10 (22.7) 8 (17.4) 25 (13.8) 
Middle 2 (2.2) 1 (2.3) 2 (4.3) 5 (2.8) 
Noa 70 (76.9) 26 (59.1) 30 (65.2) 126 (69.6) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Any education in 
SK  
Yes 21 (23.1) 18 (40.9) 16 (34.8) 55 (30.4) 5.0219+ 
Noa 70 (76.9) 26 (59.1) 30 (65.2) 126 (69.6) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Higher education 
in SK 
Yes 12 (13.2) 7 (15.9) 6 (13.0) 25 (13.8) 0.2152 
Noa 79 (86.8) 37 (84.1) 40 (87.0) 156 (86.2) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Higher education 
either in NK or 
SK  
 
Yes 33 (36.3) 18 (40.9) 8 (17.4) 59 (32.6) 6.7813* 
No 58 (63.7) 26 (59.1) 38 (82.6) 122 (67.4) 








in NK  
(4 categories) 
Sales 9 (9.9) 6 (13.6) 5 (10.9) 20 (11.0) 18.8311* 
Office clerk, elite, or 
professional 
20 (22.0) 5 (11.4) 1 (2.2) 26 (14.4) 
Soldier, laborer, or farmer 43 (47.3) 21 (47.7) 20 (43.5) 84 (46.4) 
No work, student, or etc. 19 (20.9) 12 (27.3) 18 (39.1) 49 (27.1) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Work experience 
in NK  
(3 categories) 
 
office, professional, or sales 
worker 
29 (31.9) 11 (25.0) 6 (13.6) 46 (25.7) 8.2229+ 
Soldier, laborer, or farmer 43 (47.3) 21 (47.7) 20 (45.5) 84 (46.9) 
No work, student, or etc. 19 (20.9) 12 (27.3) 18 (40.9) 49 (27.4) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 179 (100.0) 
Work experience 
in SK 
 Yes 83 (91.2) 31 (70.5) 22 (47.8) 136 (75.1) 31.4661 
*** 
No 8 (8.8) 13 (29.5) 24 (52.2) 45 (24.9) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Employment 
support programs 
in SK  
Any employment 
support programa   
Yes 52 (57.8) 22 (50.0) 30 (65.2) 104 (57.8) 2.1347 
Noa 38 (42.2) 22 (50.0) 16 (34.8) 76 (42.2) 
Total 90 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 180 (100.0) 
Any employment 
support program 
providing cashb  
Yes 47 (52.2) 20 (45.5) 27 (58.7) 94 (52.2) 1.5803 
Noa 43 (47.8) 24 (54.5) 19 (41.3) 86 (47.8) 
Total 90 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 180 (100.0) 
Job training 
program  
Yes 20 (22.0) 14 (31.8) 13 (28.3) 47 (26.0) 1.6627 
Noa 71 (78.0) 30 (68.2) 33 (71.7) 134 (74.0) 




Yes 33 (36.3) 4 (9.1) 11 (23.9) 48 (26.5) 11.4531** 
Noa 58 (63.7) 40 (90.9) 35 (76.1) 133 (73.5) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Higher education 
support 
Yes 10 (11.1) 5 (11.4) 5 (10.9) 20 (11.1) 0.0056 
Noa 80 (88.9) 39 (88.6) 41 (89.1) 160 (88.9) 
Total 90 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 180 (100.0) 
Job counselling  Yes 7 (7.7) 2 (4.5) 4 (8.7) 13 (7.2) 0.6524 
Noa 84 (92.3) 42 (95.5) 42 (91.3) 168 (92.8) 





Job fair  Yes 3 (3.3) 2 (4.5) 1 (2.2) 6 (3.3) 0.3948 
Noa 88 (96.7) 42 (95.5) 45 (97.8) 175 (96.7) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Demographic 
characteristics 
Female  Yes 63 (69.2) 27 (61.4) 35 (76.1) 125 (69.1) 2.2841 
No 28 (30.8) 17 (38.6) 11 (23.9) 56 (30.9) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Age Young (20 to 29) 7 (7.7) 9 (20.5) 13 (28.3) 29 (16.0) 18.5586** 
Middle-aged (30 to 49) 57 (62.6) 23 (52.3) 19 (41.3) 99 (54.7) 
Older (50 to 74) 16 (17.6) 12 (27.3) 11 (23.9) 39 (21.5) 
Missing 11 (12.1) 0 (0.0) 3 (6.5) 14 (7.7) 
Total 80 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 43 (100.0) 167 (100.0) 
Partner status Married or cohabiting 58 (63.7) 17 (38.6) 6 (13.0) 81 (44.8) 34.5432*** 
Unmarried 16 (17.6) 18 (40.9) 22 (47.8) 56 (30.9) 
Separated, divorced, or 
bereaved 
17 (18.7) 9 (20.5) 18 (39.1) 44 (24.3) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Having at least 
one child living 
in the household  
Yes 54 (59.3) 11 (25.0) 17 (37.0) 82 (45.3) 15.8494*** 
No 37 (40.7) 33 (75.0) 29 (63.0) 99 (54.7) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Years of 
residency in SK 
(cont.)c 
Total 79 8.7 years 
[3.826] 
40 6.7 years 
[3.752] 
45 6.7 years 
[3.966] 







Yes 11 (12.1) 11 (25.0) 18 (39.1) 40 (22.1) 13.2634** 
No 80 (87.9) 33 (75.0) 28 (60.9) 141 (77.9) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
2005 Pro-work  Yes 60 (65.9) 37 (84.1) 39 (84.8) 136 (75.1) 10.0413* 
No 19 (20.9) 3 (6.8) 6 (13.0) 28 (15.5) 
NA 12 (13.2) 4 (9.1) 1 (2.2) 17 (9.4) 
Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
Living in Seoul  Yes 49 (53.8) 19 (43.2) 16 (34.8) 84 (46.4) 5.3332 
No 30 (33.0) 20 (45.5) 22 (47.8) 72 (39.8) 





Total 91 (100.0) 44 (100.0) 46 (100.0) 181 (100.0) 
a There is no option for no; NA is counted as no. b 1) job training program, 2) license acquisition support, 3) higher education support, 4) job search counseling 
program, or 5) job fairs and job-related program. c 1) job training program, 2) license acquisition support, or 3) higher education support; d Summary statistics are 





Appendix 3-3: Multinomial logistic regression results on the Association between human capital and welfare receipt  
 Partial receipt Full receipt  
Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 Model C1 Model C2 Model C3 
Education 
                  
Higher education 





















-2.798 1.302 * -2.509 1.258 * -2.273 1.285 † 
Work experience 
                  
− in NK (soldier, 













− in NK (office 








-3.152 1.653 † -2.947 1.658 † -2.968 1.731 † 












− in  K (any job) -1.340 0.759 † -1.328 0.764 † -1.226 0.857 
 
-3.784 0.850 *** -3.638 0.824 *** -3.639 0.852 *** 
Employment 
support programs 




       
0.772 0.650 




   
-0.804 0.567 
       
0.497 0.598 
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2.864 0.983 ** 2.948 0.977 ** 3.351 1.009 ** 
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Having no 












Years of residency 
in SK 






Within a residence 
protection period 



























Living in Seoul 
(Base: Incheon, 
Gyeonggi-do) 
1.279 0.614 * 1.390 0.634 * 1.797 0.748 * 1.376 0.637 * 1.291 0.632 * 1.370 0.648 * 












N  163   163   164   163   163   164  
R2  0.3544   0.3502   0.3982   0.3544   0.3502   0.3982  
Notes: a β (regression coefficients) are presented. b 1) job training program, 2) license acquisition support, 3) higher education support, 4) job search counselling 
program, or 5) job fairs and job-related program. c 1) job training program, 2) license acquisition support, or 3) higher education support. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, 













The North Korean Defector Settlement Support System (NKDSSS) in South Korea (SK) 
has gone through many pro-work reforms since 2005, two years before the National Basic 
Livelihood Security System (NBLSS) started the pro-work reforms. This was as part of the 
global trend initiated by the pro-work reforms in the U.S. under the Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996. My dissertation examines the effects 
of the pro-work reforms on the economic adjustment of North Korean Defectors (NKDs) in 
terms of efficiency and finds policy implications in terms of equity. This dissertation finds that 
through the first wave of pro-work reforms (2005−2014), a portion of Unconditional Cash 
Transfers (UCTs) decreased; through the second wave of pro-work reforms, Conditional Cash 
Transfers (CCTs) conditioned on job preparation decreased. In other words, the targeted 
population of the NKD    has narrowed down from all NKDs (1997−2004) to job seekers or 
employed (2005−2014) and further diminished to the employed only (2015− resent). 
This dissertation further shows that the pro-work reforms did not increase economic 
adjustment, measured by employment, household income level, cash transfers as the major 
income source, and welfare receipt (compared to the pre-pro-work reforms). Focusing on the role 
of human capital, this dissertation finds that higher education either in NK or SK decreases full 
receipt only (considering higher education in NK shows no effect on full receipt, it logically 
follows that it is attributed to higher education in SK). It also suggests that work experience in 
SK was associated with reduced partial and full welfare receipt and that license acquisition 
support was associated with decreased partial welfare receipt while job training programs were 






Policy implications from my dissertation are as follows: First, in terms of efficiency, the 
effect of changes through the first pro-work period shown in Paper 1 seems to be minimal,  
considering the findings from Paper 2 (no significant differences are found between the effects of 
the pre-pro-work period and those of the first pro-work reform period) and the findings from 
Paper 3 (individual employment support programs show the opposite effects, which can offset 
each other). Second, in terms of equity, some concerns arise, given that the pro-work reforms 
may deepen the inequality within the NKD population. To illustrate, current NKDSSS has only 
CCTs conditioned on employment and amount of savings. It may deepen inequality within the 
NKD population by preferring the employed with modest income enough to save and not 
considering differences in human capital within the NKD population. The human capital level is 
varied by qualifications and personal attributes; if not taken under consideration, it may 
discriminate against NKDs with a low level of human capital.  
In order for equity not to be compromised for efficiency, this dissertation suggests the 
following future policy directions. First, it is imperative that the UCTs offer sufficient benefit 
levels for all NKDs to survive and for involuntarily unemployed NKDs to have the means to 
seek and apply for jobs until they can successfully enter the job market. Further, there should be 
some protective measures to prevent the policy changes from widening the gap in economic 
well-being among NKDs. Second, some CCTs conditioned on job preparation need to be 
reconsidered. CCTs conditioned on job preparation activities can be effective if it is carefully 
designed not to incentivize recipients to avoid full-time jobs or work under the table. As opposed 
to job training programs, license acquisition support is found to reduce partial receipt because the 
recipients did not lose the benefits from full-time employment. Unfortunately, the second pro-





elimination of CCTs for job seekers, who may desperately need them. Third, there must be some 
benefits made available for NKDs who wish to go to a track requiring a long-term education or 
training. Some NKDs may want to pursue professions that require a long-term investment (i.e., 
advanced degree); if all the benefits are placed on jobs that do not require a long-term 
investment, it will inevitably limit their career choices.  
The implications for social work practice from my dissertation are as follows: First, 
social workers should have a role in monitoring whether there are any people exposed to blind 
spots of poverty due to policy changes. For example, those who are involuntarily jobless, 
especially single-parent NKDs with young children, have been exposed to blind spots of poverty 
because they are categorized as an AU group but in reality, they are akin to the UU group. 
Sufficient time must be permitted for the blind spot of poverty to be eliminated through new 
reforms; thus, social workers should take the initiative to fill the void. Second, social workers 
need to help NKDs accumulate human capital through various routes. Specifically, social 
workers can help NKDs receive higher education in SK, encourage NKDs to enter the job market 
as soon as possible and continue working, and offer guidance on participating in employment 
support programs while suggesting career directions that can be effective both in the short-term 
and in the long-term. Social workers can also help NKDs improve their physical and mental 
health and family-related resources and help other members in the community provide mutual 
social support.  
Future studies are needed which 1) review changes in benefit levels of the recipients, 
using actual benefit levels, 2) evaluate the effect of the second wave of pro-work reforms of the 
NKDSSS, or 3) examine human capital, captured by not only qualifications (education, training, 





components of human capital.  
As a final note, in order for the NKDSSS to achieve its goals, there should be a 
transparent periodic review outside the scope of the government. The Evidence-Based Policy 
(EBP), demonstrated to increase the policy effectiveness, is ensured by opening data to the 
public. The NKD panel data maintained by the government must be made publicly accessible so 
that the system can be supplemented based on evidence. Maintaining the confidentiality of 
NKDs is a compelling governmental interest; however, there are various ways to open data while 
keeping it confidential. I hope the government opens the data so that outside researchers can 
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